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 Abstract 
Walter Eberlei (Ed.): Stakeholder Participation in Poverty Reduction. Duisburg: Insti-
tute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 
86/2007). 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) have become the most important policy 
instrument in more than 60 developing countries around the world. One of the 
core principles of the approach is country ownership, built on broad-based par-
ticipation of stakeholders inside and outside the governments, including par-
liaments, civil society organizations, private sector representatives and other 
stakeholders at national as well as local levels. How this theoretical approach 
has been realized in practice – especially beyond the strategy development – is a 
matter of debate since its introduction in 1999. 
This INEF report is an outcome of a World Bank funded research project 
on “Stakeholder Participation in PRS Implementation”. Based on several back-
ground papers of which three are published in this report (written by Thomas 
Siebold, Birte Rodenberg, and Walter Eberlei), the team draws the conclusion that 
the preconditions for meaningful participation in poverty reduction processes 
are only partially met. The necessary institutionalization of participation is still 
in its infancy. A number of constraints impede the involvement of stakeholders 
in the majority of countries, especially the inclusion of ‘the poor’ themselves.  
However, exceptions to the rule demonstrate that effective participation 
in PRS processes is possible and has been strengthened over the past few years. 
The analysis of the ongoing processes is used to develop strategic recommenda-
tions to strengthen domestic accountability, institutionalization and empower-
ment and to formulate lessons learned as well as methodological and concep-
tual insights from the practice of participation in PRS processes.  
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Stakeholder Participation in Poverty Reduction: 
Introduction and Overview 
Walter Eberlei 
1.  Introduction 
Systematic societal participa-
tion is one of the cornerstones of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) ap-
proach that was launched seven years 
ago. A lot of research work has been 
done since then to cover especially the 
inclusion of stakeholders in the draft-
ing process of PRS in – meanwhile – 
more than 60 countries. The elabora-
tion of Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(mostly during 2000-2003) has seen a 
promising amount of stakeholder 
participation in many PRS countries, 
even if considerable quality problems 
have been recognized (e.g. exclusion 
of marginalized groups, speed and 
depth, ad hoc nature of participation 
events, limited capacities of stake-
holders, urban bias, macro-economic 
and structural policies being off-
limits). Most countries have since then 
made a start on implementing their 
PRSP, although – according to many 
observers – with participation dwin-
dling instead of being institutional-
ized. However, the knowledge about 
participation in the different phases of 
the PRS cycle beyond strategy develop-
ment is still limited. 
Building on earlier work on 
participation in elaborating PRSPs, 
the Participation and Civic Engagement 
Team in the World Bank’s Social Devel-
opment Department initiated a review 
of experience with participation in 
implementation, monitoring and revi-
sions of PRSPs. The Institute for Devel-
opment and Peace (INEF, University of 
Duisburg-Essen) was commissioned to 
undertake this review work. The 
overall objective was to increase cur-
rent understanding of the status, prac-
tice and challenges of participation in 
PRS implementation (incl. monitor-
ing, evaluation, revisions, policy re-
forms, institutionalization) and to 
make conceptual as well as ´good 
practice` contributions to the current 
discussion. This INEF report docu-
ments some of the results of the 
World Bank/INEF project on “Stake-
holder participation in PRS proc-
esses”. 
In 2005, the World Bank and 
the IMF organized the second global 
review of the PRS approach. The sub-
sequent report states that “participa-
tion can help enhance the quality of 
strategies”, and the report findings 
further “point to the supportive role 
that institutionalized participation can 
have on strengthening domestic ac-
countability”. Therefore, the report 
advocates “sustaining meaningful 
participation” (IMF/World Bank 2005: 
Synthesis, 10). This is not a new de-
mand but had already been discussed 
shortly after the PRS approach came 
into being (Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith 
2001, Eberlei 2001, 2002a/b). To insti-
tutionalize participation means to inte-
grate and anchor participation in the 
political framework and the political 
processes of a country. Our research 
premise has been therefore to con-
sider participation meaningful if it is 
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rights-based, integrated in structures 
within the political environment of a 
given country and if it has empow-
ered and legitimate stakeholders.  
Measured by these standards 
(rights, structures, legitimacy, capac-
ity), our conclusion is that in most 
cases ‘institutionalized participation’ 
is at best only partially fulfilled. As 
these four elements are, in our view, 
essential for ‘meaningful participa-
tion’ they are explained briefly in the 
following paragraphs and used to 
summarize the overall findings of the 
INEF research project. 
 
 
2. Rights 
Meaningful, sustainable par-
ticipation requires a number of fun-
damental rights and safeguards.  
Looking at the broader picture, these 
requirements seem to have been met 
by PRS countries. Practically all of 
them offer their citizens the right to 
participate in political life. Today, 
freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press, right of assembly, right of asso-
ciation, etc., are enshrined among 
other aspects in the constitutions in 
most of these countries. However, as 
the INEF background studies confirm, 
reality leaves much to be desired. In 
most of the cases, the legal framework 
for participation of societal stake-
holders is only weakly developed, 
leaving a big gap between fundamen-
tal rights in the constitutions and po-
litical reality. 
Participation in the PRS process 
is only governed by law in a few ex-
ceptional cases. But even then, the 
question remains as to whether this 
right has really been put into practice 
(see the law on public participation in 
Bolivia). As a rule, legal provisions 
are missing, and a lack of transpar-
ency as regards the rules of the game 
is characteristic of most processes; in 
many countries it remains indistinct 
which stakeholders should and can 
assume which task. Thus, participa-
tion in PRS processes is at the mercy 
of the goodwill of governments or, in 
many cases, depends on the pressure 
the donors exert – and if this is re-
laxed, participation declines. The 
guidelines for the revision of the 
PRSP in Uganda and Tanzania can be 
regarded as positive examples of 
what are at least politically enforce-
able rules of the PRS process. The 
Ugandan Budget Act 2001 is a very 
rare example of a legal framework 
enhancement for parliaments. 
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3.  Structures 
Meaningful, sustainable par-
ticipation requires clearly defined 
political structures for dialogue be-
tween all stakeholders at national and 
local levels. Necessary structures have 
to be shaped on a sustainable basis 
within a defined legal framework.  
The PRS approach has defi-
nitely had an impact on the dialogues 
between governments and societal 
stakeholders. “Relative to their start-
ing points, in most countries the PRS 
approach has opened space for stake-
holders to engage in a national dia-
logue on economic policy and poverty 
reduction” (IMF/World Bank 2005: 
26). But, again in most countries, par-
ticipation in the implementation proc-
ess incl. monitoring has waned (see 
for an overview on participation in 
monitoring Eberlei / Siebold 2006). 
However, countries with established 
government–civil society dialogue 
structures witnessed comparatively 
stable participation after strategy de-
velopment (with some exceptions). 
Sometimes these structures were 
formed out of sectoral working 
groups that regularly supported the 
implementation and monitoring of 
the strategy (Albania, Uganda and - in 
a much weaker form - Zambia are 
examples of this). In some countries, 
e.g. Armenia, Mozambique and Tan-
zania, public fora organized on a 
regular basis have assumed this role.  
However, structures of this 
kind have not emerged in many coun-
tries. The participation of civil society 
continued to be correspondingly 
vague following the submission of the 
PRSP (in many cases, only occasion-
ally organized workshops with fluc-
tuating participants remain). In some 
of the countries, the donors also con-
tributed to this development by creat-
ing their own dialogue structures 
with the government (e.g. in Ghana in 
the context of budget support) in 
which significant strategic decisions 
are taken and to which civil society 
has no access. 
A few positive examples can be 
mentioned in the monitoring area. 
The Uganda Participatory Poverty 
Assessment Project (UPPAP) 
constitutes an exemplary instrument 
of institutionalized participatory 
monitoring. UPPAP is designed in 
such a way as to enable the results to 
extend into the political decision-
making processes. A whole system of 
monitoring groups with different 
tasks has been established in Tanza-
nia. Non-governmental stakeholders – 
civil society, academia, private sector, 
major faith groups and donors – are 
represented in the National Poverty 
Monitoring Steering Committee as well 
as in several working groups. Institu-
tionalized dialogue structures, also in 
the sector of budgetary control, e.g. 
Public Expenditure Reviews, are imple-
mented on a participatory basis. In 
addition, a large public forum is now 
held on an annual basis: the Poverty 
Policy Week, which can definitely be 
seen as an element of institutionalized 
dialogue structures.  
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4. Legitimacy  
The legitimacy of PRS proc-
esses has to be discussed with regard 
to several aspects. Firstly, legitimacy 
exists only in those cases in which the 
democratically elected bodies of a 
country had the possibility to influ-
ence the content of the strategy and 
are involved in its implementation 
and oversight. Secondly, civil society 
organizations do not possess the for-
mal democratic legitimation to deter-
mine the political decisions of gov-
ernments. CSOs are legitimized by 
organizing the interests of the poor 
and powerless people, and by feeding 
innovative ideas into the public policy 
debate. CSOs can increase their le-
gitimacy by making sure that they are 
organized in a representative and 
inclusive manner, that they are inde-
pendent of government and other 
major players, and that they are inter-
nally organized in a democratic way. 
Thirdly, the poor themselves have to 
be given the chance not only to articu-
late their perspectives here and there 
(e.g. via Participatory Poverty Assess-
ments) but to be involved in decision-
making processes.  
The reality in PRS countries 
shows problems on all three counts. 
Starting with the last: So far, ‘the 
poor’ and especially poor women are 
heavily underrepresented and even 
neglected in most PRS processes. 
There are only a few approaches to 
involving the “voices of the poor” in 
PRS policymaking. The above-
mentioned Ugandan experience with 
monitoring by the participatory UP-
PAP approach is unique. 
Furthermore, to improve 
institutionalization of local level 
monitoring, societal Poverty Action 
Fund Monitoring Committees were 
installed by NGOs at district level, 
consisting of nine to eleven 
representatives of NGOs, community-
based organizations, women’s 
organizations, and religious 
organizations. A few other countries 
have at least worked with a 
participatory approach to impact 
monitoring involving the ‘grassroots’. 
However, with these few exceptions 
hardly any mechanism can be found 
linking poor people to policymaking 
on a regular basis.  
As far as strengthening the le-
gitimacy of civil society organizations 
is concerned, non-state actors in a 
number of countries have teamed up 
in networks in order to increase their 
penetrating power vis-à-vis other 
stakeholders (e.g. in Zambia, Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Honduras, Cambodia). A 
strengthened self-awareness of civil-
society organizations as political ac-
tors and a strengthening of their rep-
resentativity through networks are 
certainly two of the new develop-
ments that have been encouraged by 
the PRS processes. 
The exclusion of elected bodies, 
however, is still a significant problem. 
Although the 2005 PRS review report 
draws a somewhat optimistic picture 
(“upward trend in parliamentary 
involvement in the PRS process”, 
IMF/World Bank 2005: 32), the INEF 
project team did not find examples of 
parliamentary involvement that could 
serve as “good practice”. The recently 
conducted PRS review processes in 
Burkina Faso, Uganda and Tanzania, 
for example, did not totally bypass 
the parliaments (members were usu-
ally informed through PRS-related 
workshops); however, they did not 
involve the legislative institutions 
systematically. Capacity constraints, 
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and in some cases also a limited un-
derstanding of parliament’s role in 
political processes, hinder full inclu-
sion. This practice weakens the le-
gitimacy of the PRS process. 
 
5.  Capacity 
Capacity building is often men-
tioned as a prerequisite for participa-
tory processes. However, these dis-
cussions are often restricted to techni-
cal capacities (e.g. skills to analyse 
data or to conduct participatory moni-
toring), and should be extended to 
include explicit political capacities. 
Participation can develop its full effec-
tiveness only if the participants in 
political processes are able to repre-
sent their interests adequately. This 
requires knowledge of the rules, re-
sources for defining and articulating 
political positions and experience 
with political negotiation processes, 
advocacy skills, access to information, 
specific knowledge in areas like 
macro-economics, and others.  
Our studies show that few rep-
resentatives of civil society have suffi-
cient political capabilities; they are 
often too weak to persuade the estab-
lished players to recognize their opin-
ions. This is especially true in the field 
of macro-economic policymaking 
where participation is not only lim-
ited by reluctant major players like 
the IMF or the technocrats in the min-
istries of finance but is also due to a 
lack of capacity in both the govern-
ments and non-governmental stake-
holders. Thus, many non-state actors 
were not able to conduct rigorous 
analyses on policy or budget docu-
ments or propose realistic policy al-
ternatives. Only some larger (mainly 
internationally based) NGOs, for in-
stance, are able to put forward alter-
native policy choices; the majority of 
smaller civil society organizations do 
not yet have the capacity to turn que-
ries or disagreement into credible and 
viable policy proposals. Their capac-
ity in dialogue on complex policy 
issues, such as the macroeconomic 
framework, the sequencing of struc-
tural reforms, and policy trade-offs, 
was limited. As a rule, non-state ac-
tors, especially CSOs, felt more com-
fortable discussing the ‘soft policy’ 
areas such as health and education, of 
which they had direct knowledge 
through their service delivery experi-
ence, excluding macroeconomic pol-
icy. 
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6.  Research Papers 
In the course of this research 
work, different analyses were carried 
out to obtain an overall picture of the 
status, experience and challenges 
related to the issue. Two papers pre-
pared the ground for the research 
team. One was a desk study of par-
ticipatory processes in the PRS con-
text, based mainly on findings of an 
on-going research project carried out 
on behalf of the German NGO Net-
work VENRO (published on the web-
site www.prsp-watch.de). The other 
was Thomas Siebold’s comprehensive 
review of the most important publica-
tions on participation in the PRS pol-
icy cycle; his article is published as the 
first contribution in this INEF report. 
Siebold documents the complex pic-
ture emerging from experience gath-
ered in more than 60 PRS countries. 
On the one hand, a number of observ-
ers find “that the participatory ap-
proach in PRS adds significant value 
to development efforts by opening up 
new political space for domestic civil 
societies and their representatives”. 
On the other hand, and especially 
with regard to the implementation of 
the strategies, analysts criticize the 
“serious flaws” of these processes.  
Three background papers ana-
lyzed and discussed the state of par-
ticipation in specific phases of the PRS 
cycle: Bettina Führmann (paper pub-
lished on the INEF website) looked at 
participation in policy reforms linked 
to PRS implementation. According to 
her analysis, participation in policy 
reforms is largely limited to sector 
reforms (especially on social issues); 
some examples can also be found of 
participation in structural reforms. 
However, the macroeconomic reforms 
are still dominated by (central) gov-
ernment with the strong influence of 
the World Bank, the IMF and other 
donors. An open debate on macro-
economic goals and policies is largely 
excluded from the consultation pro-
cesses. Thomas Siebold and Walter  
Eberlei took an in-depth look at par-
ticipation in the monitoring of PRS 
implementation (paper also published 
on the INEF website). Their report 
shows, first of all, that many countries 
with a full PRSP have made efforts to 
develop and implement some kind of 
PRS monitoring system. In many 
cases, governments have invited so-
cietal stakeholders to participate in 
the monitoring exercises in one way 
or another. A multitude of monitoring 
methods, techniques and tools have 
been developed in recent years. De-
spite these developments, there is 
plenty of room for improvement. 
Conceptual weaknesses, capacity 
constraints, in some cases also a lack 
of political will to implement trans-
parent accountability systems are 
among the reasons for inadequate 
monitoring systems. A lack of struc-
tures for participatory monitoring, the 
absence of legal frameworks, parallel 
monitoring processes of donors un-
dermining domestic accountability, 
limited technical capacity of civil soci-
ety groups – these and other short-
comings are highlighted by the au-
thors. Their overall conclusion: De-
spite positive developments, there is 
still some way to institutionalize 
stakeholder involvement in the politi-
cal systems and processes of PRS 
countries. A necessary step to change 
this would be to understand the PRS 
process as an eminently political 
process, a process that is better asso-
ciated with ‘competition’ rather than 
with ‘partnership’ of stakeholders in a 
society. The third background paper 
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is Walter Eberlei’s analysis of participa-
tion in PRS review processes (see his 
article in this INEF report). He shows 
that societal participation was a sig-
nificant element during the revision 
process and formulation of a “second-
generation PRSP” in all five countries 
that have by now completed the pro-
cess. Compared with the preparation 
phase of the first PRS in these coun-
tries, participation has improved in 
terms of both quantity and quality. 
However, there are a number of 
shortcomings, among them: sparse 
participation by elected bodies, priori-
tization behind closed doors, a strong 
donor influence and – most crucial in 
the authors’ view – no inclusion of the 
poor and very poor strata of society. 
Based on these papers (as well 
as on additional useful input by col-
leagues, especially Frank Bliss and 
Reiner Forster) two final studies were 
produced. Birte Rodenberg formulated 
Guidelines for Practitioners. Lessons 
learned, methodological and concep-
tual developments from the practice 
of participation in PRS processes 
around the world are summarized in 
her contribution which is part of this 
INEF report. She structures her in-
sights around the main stages of the 
PRS policy cycle. Specific cross-
cutting perspectives on empowerment 
and inclusion – crucial for a broader 
participation in future – are high-
lighted separately as well as some 
actor-specific recommendations. 
In a separate paper (to be pub-
lished by the World Bank), Walter 
Eberlei synthesizes the results of the 
research projects and draws some 
conceptual conclusions.1 Based on the 
                                                     
1  Walter Eberlei: Unfolding Communicative 
Power in Poverty Reduction. The paper will be 
published by the World Bank and will also be 
posted on the INEF website. 
above outlined findings (especially: 
institutionalization of participation in 
its infancy; number of constraints; 
however, exceptions to the rule dem-
onstrate the potential), Eberlei dis-
cusses four core challenges for em-
bedding stakeholder participation in 
the living political environment of 
PRS countries: 
• The principle of country owner-
ship including domestic account-
ability has so far been realized 
in only a handful of countries. 
Governments in many PRS 
countries are still concerned 
primarily with meeting the 
conditions imposed by donors 
and/or are dominated by the 
interests of the non-poor elite. 
These are major impediments 
to meaningful participation. 
• A development orientation of 
‘the state’ – including open-
ness for poverty reduction 
politics and societal participa-
tion – cannot be assumed 
automatically. There is plenty 
of evidence that politics in a 
number of the poorest coun-
tries is still permeated by 
‘neopatrimonial’ practices. 
• The relationship between a so-
ciety and its political system as 
well as the role of civil society 
in this interplay are poorly 
understood in many PRS pro-
cesses. Using Habermas’ dis-
course theory, Eberlei advo-
cates a review of the concep-
tual framework for participa-
tion: Civil societies have a cru-
cial role to play, translating the 
interests of the people into 
‘communicative power’. But 
the transformation into ‘ad-
ministrative power’ (executed 
by governments) has to take 
place in the democratically le-
Walter Eberlei 
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gitimized bodies, especially in 
parliaments.  
• ‘Powerlessness’ is a form of 
poverty and a major cause of 
poverty. The distribution of 
power is therefore a highly 
relevant topic for poverty re-
duction debates. The findings 
underline the urgent need to 
start ‘empowerment initia-
tives’ and to discuss the under-
lying issues. 
The paper concludes with stra-
tegic recommendations to strengthen 
domestic accountability, institutional-
ized participation and empowerment. 
They are based on the key assumption 
that a breakthrough in the fight 
against poverty needs a coalition of 
stakeholders in the civil societies and 
political forces in the legislative bod-
ies of PRS countries, unfolding ‘com-
municative power’ to point ‘adminis-
trative power’ in the pro-poor direc-
tion. 
  
Participation in PRS Processes: 
A Review of the International Debate 
Thomas Siebold 
1.  Summary 
Contributors to the interna-
tional debate find that the participa-
tory approach in PRS adds significant 
value to development efforts by open-
ing up new political space for domes-
tic civil societies and their representa-
tives.1 The new approach potentially 
democratizes political processes. 
However, it is seen to have serious 
flaws, particularly as far as implemen-
tation is concerned. Participation, 
meant to range from information-
sharing to control by stakeholders, is 
confined to consultation in most 
cases. Selection of participants in the 
process often lacks representativity; 
legitimacy is sometimes doubtful. 
Important stakeholders (e.g. parlia-
ments) are often excluded and above 
all ‘the real poor’ play at best a mar-
ginal role. Meaningful participation is 
also hindered by missing institutional 
frameworks and legal provisions for 
participation. Further obstacles are 
limited capacities of CSOs, rigid time-
tables, non-availability of PRSP drafts 
in local languages, and an urban-bias 
of the process. The International Fi-
nance Institutions (IFIs) have not yet 
developed satisfactory minimum 
standards for participation processes. 
Thus, influence of civil society and its 
representatives on program design 
remains limited; the process largely 
                                                     
1  The author would like to thank Walter 
Eberlei, Christina-Maria Kreibich and Arne 
Wunder for extremely helpful contributions 
and propositions. 
excludes the underlying macroeco-
nomic framework. Macroeconomics 
remain an issue that is at best negoti-
ated between governments and IFIs, 
but the impression is that most deci-
sions are made in Washington and do 
not differ much from conventional 
structural adjustment measures. Ex-
periences with the process have led to 
skepticism among many civil society 
representatives and some reckon that 
the whole exercise is a convenient 
camouflage for the IFIs to maintain 
their influence on developing coun-
tries. This is one reason why national 
ownership remains to be desired. In 
most countries PRS-related participa-
tion wanes when PRSP formulation is 
completed; participation in imple-
mentation, monitoring, and evalua-
tion is largely neglected. Recommen-
dations urge that participation should 
be more encompassing and include 
the really poor. The process should be 
institutionalized by the establishment 
of a permanent framework. Participa-
tion should include macroeconomic 
issues and decisions on them should 
be relocated to the country. Observers 
also urge that participation goes be-
yond program formulation and par-
ticipants are to be endowed with ap-
propriate tools for monitoring and 
evaluation. 
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2.  Introduction 
If PRS processes have become 
the lynchpin to development in low-
income countries, this is not least be-
cause of its new participatory ap-
proach. The IFIs have declared par-
ticipation one of the six core princi-
ples of their new development phi-
losophy. To maximize the effective-
ness of anti-poverty strategies during 
their design, implementation, moni-
toring, and evaluation a participatory 
process aims to link the donor com-
munity with all stakeholders of soci-
ety. 
Not surprisingly the new par-
ticipatory approach has attracted 
much discussion in the development 
community. Academic scholars, re-
search institutes, international organi-
zations, international and national 
NGOs, the independent evaluation 
departments of the IFIs, and the IFIs 
themselves have contributed to this 
debate with principal considerations 
and empirical research work. The 
bulk of publications come from inter-
national NGOs. On some issues con-
tributors reach a remarkable degree of 
consensus, on other issues their con-
clusions differ more or less. Different 
appraisals are not only due to differ-
ent ideological positions but often 
because of different experiences in 
different countries.  
The following overview resorts 
mainly to contributions that have 
been published since 2002. For the 
debate up to 2002 it refers to the 
World Bank’s “Retrospective Study” 
published in January 2002 that sum-
marizes the early observations of de-
velopment and non-governmental 
agencies (World Bank 2002) and the 
Paper of Rosemary McGee and Andy 
Norton (2000) that synthesizes first 
experiences with participatory ap-
proaches. However, country case 
studies have been included as an ex-
ception, rather than as a rule. The 
overview is structured according to 
four key questions: 
1. What are the overall perspec-
tives on the participative ap-
proach in the PRS policy cycle? 
2. Stakeholder perspective: Who 
participates, who doesn’t? 
3. Process perspective: How has 
participation been realized in 
the different PRS phases, espe-
cially beyond strategy devel-
opment? 
4. Framework perspective: What 
are key factors supporting or 
hindering sustainable policy 
impact of participation? 
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3.  The International Debate: Main Messages 
Box 1:  Overview 
Overall perspectives 
1.  The participative approach is a significant step forward in the develop-
ment aid arena 
2.  The new approach has already had some positive outcomes 
3.  A dissent: Fundamental critiques doubt that progress is made by the 
approach 
Stakeholder perspectives 
4.  The approach intends an anti-poverty effort of all stakeholders—but so-
ciety works differently 
5.  Participation embraced a wide range of stakeholders, but important 
stakeholders were excluded 
6.  The approach risks by-passing of existing institutions and processes 
7.  The power asymmetry between IFIs on the one side and governments 
and CSOs on the other led to self-censorship and anticipatory obedience 
8.  The IFIs did not really foster the participation process 
Process perspectives 
9.  Participation is meant to be encompassing but is reduced to consultation 
10.  Influence of civil society on program design was negligible 
11.  The macroeconomic framework was widely excluded in the participation 
process 
12.  Ownership remains to be desired 
13.  Participation in implementation and monitoring of PRS has been very 
weak 
Framework perspectives 
14.  Minimum standards for meaningful participation are missing 
15.  An institutional framework for participation was missing in many cases 
16.  Participation processes have been hindered by a number of constraints, 
among others: time, capacity, communication, and urban-bias 
 
Overall perspectives 
1. The participative approach is a 
significant step forward in the develop-
ment aid arena. An overwhelming ma-
jority of contributors to the interna-
tional debate on participation in PRS 
processes lauds the new approach for 
having the potential to open up new 
fora for domestic public debate. A 
PRS process might be able to create 
policy spaces in which more voices 
can be heard and neglected policy 
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bottlenecks be exposed to a wider 
national public.  
Thornton and Cox (2005: 25) 
qualify the approach as “the most 
participatory policy exercise yet un-
dertaken” and for Cling and others 
(2003: 2) it “has great potential for 
strengthening democracy in countries 
where the people generally have very 
few means of making themselves 
heard.” Other observers are more 
cautious. Referring to experiences in 
four countries, Piron and Evans (2004: 
19) recommend not to overemphasize 
the politically transformative role of 
the process because its executive and 
technocratic aspects prevail. Sesha-
mani (2005) suggests three general 
views in assessing the novelty of the 
PRS approach: The first one lauds PRS 
as “new wine in a new bottle” (Se-
shamani 2005: 5), seeing a deepened 
conceptualization of poverty, and a 
more comprehensive, participatory 
and long-term approach towards 
poverty reduction. The second per-
spective characterizes PRS as “the 
same old wine but provided with a 
new bottle”, implying that despite “a 
number of institutional changes that 
may produce some positive impact on 
efficiency in handling programs (…) it 
is still business as usual” (Seshamani 
2005: 9). The third, “most pessimistic 
view” blames PRS as “the same old 
wine in the same old bottle”, with 
only cosmetic and superficial changes 
to the aid architecture (Seshamani 
2005: 9). 
2. The new approach has already 
had some positive outcomes. The World 
Bank’s “Retrospective Study” con-
cluded that the new approach leads to 
a better understanding and diagnosis 
of poverty, its multi-dimensional na-
ture, its causes and spatial aspects 
(World Bank 2002: 13). This assess-
ment is confirmed by the more recent 
literature on participation. The PRS 
consultations not only helped to 
broaden the government’s under-
standing of poverty, the process also 
resulted in an unprecedented en-
gagement of civil society organiza-
tions in anti-poverty debates    
(Thornton and Cox 2005: 10; Driscoll 
and Evans 2004: 3).  
A number of authors observe 
enlarged capacities both on govern-
ments’ side and on the side of civil 
society (McGee and others 2002: 18): 
Governments capacity to engage in 
policy dialogue with non-govern-
mental stakeholders has increased 
(Grindle 2002: 10f.). “Many officials 
and politicians have had their first 
experience of engaging directly with 
civil society organizations on matters 
of public policy through a national 
consultation process as a result of the 
PRS process” (Driscoll and Evans 
2004: 4).  
Observers also argue that the 
PRS process has helped civil society to 
organize them and to build much-
needed legitimacy in difficult political 
environments. In this development, 
international NGOs played an impor-
tant role; with their consultancy they 
enabled national civil society organi-
zations (CSOs) to increase their capac-
ity for policy analysis, advocacy and 
networking (Thornton and Cox 2005: 
10; Booth 2003a: 27). Thus, in many 
countries, the PRS process increased 
the political space for CSOs and con-
tributed to broadening the debate 
over economic and social policy 
(UNDP 2003: 27; Currah 2004: 5). In 
this context, a notable development 
has been the rise of civil society net-
works. Not least there has been some 
improvement in domestic policymak-
ing systems, because the PRSP formu-
lation required improved intra-
governmental coordination and ex-
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change (Piron and Evans 2004: 34). At 
the same time, many authors stress 
that the increase in openness to par-
ticipation in public policy making 
remains marginal and that “the posi-
tive gains made are fragile and un-
even across countries” (Trócaire 2004: 
3; see also Wood 2004: 20). 
The CIDSE/Caritas Internatio-
nalis study on 19 countries found that 
the sustainability of an open public 
dialogue on poverty issues depends 
on the given political culture in the 
countries. According to the authors, 
experiences can be divided broadly in 
three categories: (i) prospects for sus-
tainability are quite good in countries 
where civil society engagement in 
public policy was relatively well-
developed in the pre-PRSP-era; ex-
amples are Uganda and Zambia; (ii) 
this is less true for countries where 
the level of civil society organization 
and the concept of participation is 
relatively new for governments but 
has been accepted in principle; exam-
ples are Malawi, Rwanda und Hon-
duras; (iii) in the last category are 
countries where participation and 
openness were largely imposed by 
donors, where only little or no change 
in public debate and decision-making 
took place; examples are most franco-
phone countries in Africa and Ethio-
pia (CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 
2004: 5ff).  
3. A dissent: Fundamental cri-
tiques doubt that progress is made by the 
approach. In concurrence of the major-
ity of contributors some critics chal-
lenge the assumption that PRS pro-
cesses reinforce democracy and offer 
opportunities for broadening the pub-
lic debate on poverty issues. On the 
contrary, for them they have at least 
the potential to undermine existing 
democratic structures (see argument 
above) and to consolidate the hege-
mony of donor’s interests in the de-
velopment arena. For Brown (2003: 5) 
the flaw of the participative approach 
is already revealed in the World Bank 
Sourcebook: “What is under discus-
sion here [in the Sourcebook] is a 
highly manipulated form of public 
consultation, in which stakeholder 
participation is achieved through a 
process of active selection, based 
upon subjective, and not necessarily 
openly articulated, standards of le-
gitimacy and representativeness.” 
And: “Whilst some publics are to be 
given a voice, this is on a purely dis-
cretionary basis, as a condescension 
not a right. The voice which is granted 
is neither fundamental nor universal” 
(Brown 2003: 6). Also for Fraser (2003) 
participation can be manipulated to 
achieve the outcomes government 
and donors want. Requiring partici-
pants to accept the ‘rule of the game’ 
“the process (…) is designed by and 
for groups able to express their pro-
ject in the technocratic language of 
planning and poverty.” Thus he 
qualifies participation in the frame-
work of PRSPs as “the new tyranny.” 
For these critics it is not evident for 
CSOs to engage in the participatory 
process of PRS; participation that is at 
best ‘invited consultation’ could lend 
“a false legitimacy to autocratically 
made decisions” (Alexander 2004: 12, 
see also Tan 2005). 
Stakeholder perspectives 
4. The approach intends an anti-
poverty effort of all stakeholders—but 
society works differently. The funda-
mental critics raise a point that is also 
mentioned by other contributors. 
“Participation is inherently political”, 
states the World Bank Sourcebook 
(2002a), “and it requires thinking in 
terms of interest groups and incen-
tives” (Tikare and others 2002: 257). 
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Actually, many observers state that 
PRSPs do not take into account con-
flicts of interest within society. The 
PRS process presumes that the inter-
ests of all sections of society are to be 
reconciled (Cling and others 2003: 
195). But this is a misbelief; conflicts 
do not disappear by using participa-
tory methods and the empowerment 
of marginalized sections of society—
this is what the PRSP approach also 
stands for—is a highly conflictive and 
political process (Knoke and Morazan 
2002: 19). “A national consensus 
which obscures the fact that there will 
be losers as well as winners, probably 
among the poor as well as between 
the poor and the non-poor, will do the 
poor no service” (Maxwell 2003: 15). 
Insofar it does not address conflicts of 
interest, conclude Cling and others 
(2003a: 173), “the participatory proc-
ess concept is ‘utopian’.”  
5. Participation embraced a wide 
range of stakeholders, but important 
stakeholders were excluded. Participation 
in PRSP formulation tended to be 
‘broad’ rather than ‘deep’ as the IFIs 
noted in their “Progress in Implemen-
tation”-Reports (IMF/IDA 2003: 6; 
IMF/IDA 2003a: 3) confirming the 
conclusion of the Retrospective Study 
that summarized the observations of 
development and non-governmental 
agencies (World Bank 2002: 9). Al-
though the selection of stakeholders 
to participate normally was not ran-
dom or ad hoc, the process lacked 
transparency and fell short of the 
Sourcebook’s demands to include 
poor and vulnerable groups system-
atically, especially women (Trócaire 
2004: 4; Tikare and others 2002: 239). 
In some countries the selection of 
CSOs evidently followed political 
considerations or was made on the 
basis of clientelism and patronage 
(Possing 2003: 11f.). Obviously, it was 
and remains a big challenge to in-
clude ‘the real poor and vulnerable’ in 
the process. In most cases these con-
stituencies were addressed via prox-
ies: NGOs, CSO networks, and um-
brella societies.  
CSOs usually develop their 
own agenda and often their represen-
tativity is far from being satisfying. 
Deficiencies of CSO-representativity 
are not only a result of limited capac-
ity to do outreach and to consult con-
stituencies in remote areas; it is also 
often due to the fact that they are 
dominated by urban professionals 
with limited contact to ‘the poor’ 
(McGee and others 2002: 9; Trócaire 
2004: 4; DFID 2004: 22). Observers 
acknowledge that some CSOs tried to 
consult with their grassroots but add 
that detailed studies are required to 
evaluate to what extent their composi-
tion and behavior is qualified for rep-
resenting poor people at local levels 
(Whitehead 2003: 30; Stewart and 
Wang 2003: 9). For the record: al-
though PRSPs frequently referred to 
the poor, it was surrogates for the 
poor (NGOs of all kinds) who actually 
participated in the process (Grindle 
2002: 10). Oxfam International (2004: 
5) deplores “that significant sums 
have been spent to ensure the partici-
pation of many people, but there are 
often not the right people.” The 
World Bank’s “Retrospective Study” 
states somewhat euphemistically: 
“The real poor have not partaken 
extensively in the process” (World 
Bank 2002: 10). 
A range of observers point to 
the fact that the participation exercise 
favors NGOs who are able and will-
ing to accept the ‘rules of the (partici-
pation) game’, whereas groups that 
lack capacity or are out of favor with 
the government (e.g. trade unions in 
Malawi) or foreign NGOs are likely to 
be excluded. The process tends to 
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benefit a small group of preferably 
foreign funded NGOs and to split 
society (CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 
2004: 5; Driscoll and Evans 2004: 9). 
This is why Possing (2003: 12) con-
cludes: “The process has often been 
more exclusive than inclusive.”  
The problem of representativity 
raises questions about the legitimacy 
of chosen civil society stakeholders in 
the process (McGee and others 2002: 
10; Brown 2003: 5; Sanchez and Cash 
2003: 20). In view of the fact that na-
tional parliaments, as well as the multi-
tude of democratically elected re-
gional and local bodies—institutions 
normally endowed with legitimacy—
have been widely neglected or ex-
cluded, these questions become even 
more pressing. Eberlei and Henn 
(2003: 9) found that parliaments so far 
played only marginal roles in the 
design, implementation and monitor-
ing of poverty reduction strategies 
(see also Stewart and Wang 2003: 15; 
World Bank 2002: 11; World Bank 
2004: 11f.; Wood 2004a: 41; Booth 
2003a: 29; Sanchez and Cash 2003: 17; 
Lucas and others 2004: 19). A specific 
concern herein is “the lack of budget 
and financial control on the part of 
parliament” (Langdon and Draman 
2005: 22). This is especially worrying 
as parliaments, whether national or 
regional ones have numerous ‘com-
petitive advantages’ compared to 
other stakeholders in the PRS process, 
and would have a variety of credible 
entry points to make the PRS process 
more legitimate and accountable. 
After all, the “Progress in Implemen-
tation”-Reports see growing parlia-
mentary involvement in PRS formula-
tion, oversight, and implementation 
(IMF/IDA 2003: 2; World Bank/IMF 
2004: 17), which is backed by more 
recent observations (Langdon and 
Draman 2005: 14).  
All observers note that key sec-
tions of civil society (e.g. religious and 
community based organizations, rural 
groups, indigenous people, children, 
persons with disabilities) and some-
times of the government (e.g. line 
ministries, local governments or ad-
ministrations) were missing from the 
participation process or underrepre-
sented (Stewart and Wang 2003: 15; 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 2004: 4; 
ILO 2002). Some studies deplore that 
the process “does not involve children 
and young people taking the lead in 
decision-making around the advocacy 
process” (O’Malley 2004: 1; see also 
Heidel 2004). 
In many countries women or-
ganizations did not participate in the 
process; in several countries a quota 
for women’s representation did not 
exist (Sanchez and Cash 2003: 16). 
Indeed, most PRSPs mentioned gen-
der issues and recognized them as a 
crosscutting theme, but the hoped 
‘engendering’ of the poverty debate 
appears not to have happened on a 
regular basis (exception: Kenya and 
Rwanda; McGee and others 2002: 17; 
Zuckerman and Garrett 2003: 8). It is 
the impression of many observers that 
mostly lip service has been paid to 
gender concerns (World Bank 2002: 
10; UNDP 2003: 24; Zuckerman and 
Garrett 2003; Rodenberg 2004).  
In countries where a culture of 
social dialogue existed in pre-PRSP-
times, trade unions were invited and 
normally participated in the PRS dis-
cussion, but not in program imple-
mentation, monitoring or evaluation. 
Their effective involvement in discus-
sion depended on a structured par-
ticipatory process (that lacked in most 
cases) and their (sometimes strained) 
relationship with governments. In 
countries with more than one national  
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trade union, some unions did not 
partake (Egulu 2004; 2004a). In the 
majority of cases the private sector 
(which is considered de facto a part of 
civil society) was actively involved in 
the drafting process of the PRSP, al-
though in a number of cases (e.g. in 
Cambodia, Malawi and Vietnam) its 
role appears to have been limited (Fox 
2003: 3). In some cases, the private 
sector dominated the discussion on 
privatization. The Independent 
Evaluation Department of the Fund 
qualifies business sector involvement 
in retrospective as “often unsatisfac-
tory” (IMF/IEO 2004: 19) but both IFIs 
see growing engagement in PRS for-
mulation and monitoring in more 
recent times, not only of the private 
sector but also of trade unions (World 
Bank/IMF 2004: 18; see also IMF/IDA 
2003: 6; IMF/IDA 2003a: 3). This view 
is challenged by a later review of  
African PRSPs that shows that private 
sector involvement in implementation 
and monitoring is waning (Fox 2004: 
5).  
6. The approach risks by-passing of 
existing institutions and processes. Al-
though the World Bank stresses in its 
Sourcebook that “building on existing 
political processes and institutional 
arrangements is a key factor in suc-
cessful national consultations” (Tikare 
and others 2002: 245), this advice does 
not seem to be adhered to in many 
cases. Oxfam International (2004: 7) 
observes PRS processes of having 
“largely circumvented existing pro-
cesses of representative democracy”. 
The by-passing of existing institu-
tions, some observers are concerned, 
can potentially weaken elected gov-
ernments and is not necessarily in the 
interest of the poor over the longer 
term (Stewart and Wang 2003: 27; 
Grindle 2002: 23; CIDSE/Caritas In-
ternationalis 2004a: 10f.; Tan 2005: 21–
22). “In non-democratic regimes, 
however, the situation is different and 
broadening participation may be par-
ticularly beneficial, contributing to the 
democratisation of decision-making.” 
(Stewart and Wang 2003: 27) 
7. The power asymmetry between 
IFIs on the one side and governments and 
CSOs on the other led to self-censorship 
and anticipatory obedience. The urgency 
to fulfill HIPC-terms and the deeper 
insight that IFIs would prevail any-
way induced many governments to 
steer the participation process in a 
direction they were convinced to 
please the IFIs, several observers re-
port. The CIDSE/Caritas Internatio-
nalis-Study (2004: 5) found that con-
sultations were hindered by the pres-
ence of government officials (Viet-
nam) or the awareness that alternative 
proposals would be rejected by do-
nors (Niger). In some cases (e.g. Hon-
duras) CSOs have the impression that 
their government engaged in the par-
ticipatory process only to fulfill do-
nor-requirements and had no real 
commitment to take their views into 
account; in other countries (e.g. Zam-
bia) CSOs confirm that governments 
took the process seriously (Sanchez 
and Cash 2003: 20). There is not at last 
the fear of some CSOs of being co-
opted by the government and/or the 
IFIs and being used to legitimize pre-
determined policy choices they are 
opposed to (Sanchez and Cash 2003: 
21; see also CIDSE/Caritas Interna-
tionalis 2004: 5; Wood 2004a: 39;   
Akpokavie 2004: 3). This led in some 
countries to parallel participation 
processes initiated by civil society. 
8. The IFIs did not really foster the 
participation process. Some observers 
deal with the role the IFIs played so 
far in the process of formulation, im-
plementation and monitoring of PRS 
and find that their strong influence 
runs counter to participative nature of 
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the new approach. Summarizing the 
experience of their informants 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis (2004: 
25) concludes that “staff [of the IFIs] 
have not internalised the collaborative 
nature of participation and they are, 
in general, not open about their own 
programs nor are they prepared to 
enter into a dialogue about them with 
civil society.” CIDSE/Caritas Interna-
tionalis (2004: 19) concedes the IMF to 
be more open to contact civil society 
than in the past, but Wood (2004a: 30) 
states that the Fund “has made no 
substantive proposals on widening its 
negotiations to include a broad range 
of stakeholders, releasing draft docu-
ments, establishing better consulta-
tion mechanisms, and so on.” A range 
of observers is convinced that espe-
cially the IMF ‘way of doing business’ 
has not been changed by the new 
philosophy. According to them, the 
promise of having ‘more policy op-
tions’ is mere theory; “in reality there 
is little evidence that these options are 
any more than discussion points be-
fore clients fall into line with Fund 
recommendations” (Currah 2004: 3). 
This criticism can be specified with 
regard to the IFI’s treatment of legisla-
tives. While the IFIs seem to be in-
creasingly supportive of parliaments 
in the PRS process, they do not only 
continue to exert informal policy ad-
vice on country officials, but also con-
tinuously override parliamentary 
decisions (Jones and Hardstaff 2005: 
10; ActionAid International 2005: 4). 
Some observers also blame 
other donors and international NGOs 
for hindering civil society to play a 
more meaningful role in political 
processes, a debate which culminated 
into the call for strengthened “donor 
accountability” (Eurodad 2004; Piron 
and Evans 2004: 31). Referring to the 
Rwandan case where a very authori-
tarian state is unwilling to let civil 
society play a role in the policy debate 
Renard and Molenaers (2003: 23) criti-
cize that influential donors and inter-
national NGOs (Christian Aid, Ac-
tionAid) declared themselves satisfied 
“and in some cases even enthusiastic” 
with the cosmetic participation exer-
cise. They conclude that “the excited 
participation rhetoric is in fact not 
very helpful when donors attempt to 
‘strengthen’ civil society or increase 
its political role in concrete country 
settings” (Renard and Molenaers 
2003: 7). The authors point to the fact 
that the important role of interna-
tional NGOs in PRSP processes can 
pose a threat to the emergence of a 
vigorous civil society. 
Process perspectives 
9. Participation is meant to be en-
compassing but is reduced to consulta-
tion. On the much cited ‘ladder of 
participation’ by McGee and Norton 
(2000: 17f.), involvement in decisions 
can vary along a spectrum ranging 
from (i) information-sharing, (ii) con-
sultation, (iii) joint decision-making to 
(iv) initiation and control by stake-
holders. Most observers insinuate that 
the most far-reaching participation is 
desirable. Molenaers and Renard 
(2002: 5) are more skeptical. Referring 
to the Bolivian example they con-
clude: “Participation is not necessarily 
good for combating poverty. There 
may be cases where there is too much 
participation for effectiveness sake.”  
Following its Sourcebook—
“Participation is the process by which 
stakeholders influence and share con-
trol over priority setting, policymak-
ing, resource allocations, and/or pro-
gram implementation”—the World 
Bank’s concept of participation clearly 
envisages initiation and control    
(Tikare and others 2002: 237). How-
ever, as far as civil society is con-
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cerned, almost all observers conclude 
that participation had been confined 
to consultation. In most cases the con-
sultation process was limited to the 
preparation of the PRSP; in a number 
of cases the process went beyond and 
was used also in the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation course of 
action (Oxfam International 2004: 1; 
Bretton Woods Project 2003a: 7;    
Sanchez and Cash 2003: 18; 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 2004: 4). 
IFIs and donors, but particu-
larly governments interpreted par-
ticipation—contrary to the definition 
cited above—largely as information 
exchange and consultation. Partici-
pants had the right to express opin-
ions and to suggest some priority 
actions—preferably on social matters, 
less on macroeconomic topics—but 
were not guaranteed that their con-
cerns would be incorporated into the 
decision-making process or the PRSP. 
Exceptions that prove the rule are 
countries such as Zambia, Uganda 
and Cambodia, where the govern-
ment made provisions for civil society 
involvement (Trócaire 2004: 4; 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 2004: 4; 
McGee and others 2002: 7; Grindle 
2002: 9; Wood 2004: 20). But positive 
examples do not override the view of 
many CSOs that the PRS process to 
date has been little more than a public 
relations exercise (Wood 2004a: 39). 
The blatant difference between prin-
ciples and practice led to disappoint-
ment in the CSO community (World 
Bank 2004: 13). According to Trócaire 
(2004: 4) the inconsistency threatens to 
undermine the whole process. 
10. Influence of civil society on 
program design was negligible. Observ-
ers almost unanimously see only little 
impact of consultation processes and 
their outcomes on program docu-
ments. “The most glaring problem”, 
writes Whitehead (2003: 23) “lies in 
the follow through from the findings 
of the local participation exercise to 
the PRSP document itself.” McGee 
and others (2002: 8) report: “What is 
said at consultations is perceived by 
participants to have disappeared into 
a ‘black box’ where Ministry of Fi-
nance officials (…) write a plan which 
little reflects their inputs” (see also 
Curran 2005; Trócaire 2004: 4; Sanchez 
and Cash 2003: 25; Grindle 2002: 10; 
World Bank 2004: 13, Stewart and 
Wang 2003: 17; Dembele 2003). There 
are nevertheless examples where 
NGOs have successfully influenced 
PRSP content, e.g. topics as gender 
equality or AIDS (Driscoll and Jenks 
2004: 12). The civil society coalition in 
Zambia found close to 80% of its in-
put reflected in the PRSP while pro-
posals of the civil society in Honduras 
remained unaccounted for (Possing 
2003: vii). 
In many cases, however, the fi-
nal documents included civil society 
demands on a rhetorical basis only 
while ignoring fundamental propos-
als for policy changes. Giving the 
example of Senegal where CSOs and 
the government had prioritized edu-
cation but no strategy concerning this 
matter was to be found in the PRSP, 
Wood (2004: 22) concludes that in the 
end, concerns of civil society are not 
taken into account. Referring to the 
case of Bolivia, Willems (2003) speaks 
of “participation without power” and 
Alexander (2004: 6) quotes a NGO 
representative saying, “here’s how I 
conjugate the verb ‘to participate’: I 
participate, you participate, he/she/it 
participates, they decide.”  
Beyond the apparent lack of in-
termediate impact however, Curran 
(2005: 13) sees evidence that stake-
holders successfully influenced “pol-
icy processes besides the final policies 
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written in strategies”. Sometimes 
issues require extended research, con-
tinuous advocacy and networking, 
and only materialize later in the PRS 
cycle. “In short, even where civil soci-
ety has had no impact on the details 
of policies or resource allocation, they 
have contributed to strengthening the 
accountability channels between gov-
ernments and citizens” (Curran 2005: 
13). 
11. The macroeconomic framework 
was widely excluded in the participation 
process. Almost all contributors deal 
critically with the relationship be-
tween poverty reduction strategies 
and the underlying macroeconomic 
framework. Ideally, the participation 
process enables stakeholders to dis-
cuss and to design all relevant poli-
cies, including macroeconomic and 
structural policies. Most observers 
state that the latter were often, though 
not universally, excluded from dis-
cussions. This was not only due to the 
capacity constraints of many CSOs 
but also to governments’ practice to 
limit discussions to the social ele-
ments of poverty reduction strategies 
(Sanchez and Cash 2003: 18; White-
head 2003: 13; CIDSE/Caritas Interna-
tionalis 2004: 7; Wood 2004a: 37). 
Partners of ActionAid even reported 
that they were “barred” from partici-
pating in macroeconomic and struc-
tural policy discussions (ActionAid 
USA/ActionAid Uganda 2004: 28). 
“Major development decision-making 
occurs in the ‘great house’”, Alexan-
der (2004: 4) states ironically, “while 
citizens’ groups provide ancillary 
input from their policy ‘sandbox’.” 
Also the “Progress in Implementa-
tion”-Report 2004 finds that “there is 
as yet relatively little evidence of a 
broad-based and open discussion of 
macroeconomic policy alternative in 
PRSPs” (World Bank/IMF 2004: 19).  
The impression of many ob-
servers and their partners in the coun-
tries that civil society influence to 
alter or to shape the macroeconomic 
framework underlying PRSs is virtu-
ally nil, has led to deep frustration 
and skepticism (McGee and others 
2002: 13). Oxfam International (2004: 
9) gives the example of Armenia 
where civil society fully engaged in 
technical macroeconomic debates 
about the PRSP and where in close 
cooperation with the Ministry of Fi-
nance targets for the reduction of 
inequality as well as for growth were 
agreed and incorporated in the first 
draft of the PRSP. When the second 
draft was published, the young 
economists of civil society had to 
learn that the commonly agreed 
macro framework had been replaced 
in favor of the figures agreed with the 
IMF under the Poverty Reduction 
Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement.  
Observers doubt the assertion 
of the IMF that PRGFs were based 
upon PRSPs; their impression is that 
in many cases the reverse was true. 
PRSPs were at best starting points for 
negotiations between governments 
and IFIs; all crucial details were out-
lined in the PRGF and Country Assis-
tance Strategy (CAS) documents that 
are not publicly available during the 
negotiation process (Eberlei and   
Siebold 2002: 41–49; Stewart and 
Wang 2003: 18; Wood 2004a: 41). 
CSOs are particularly suspicious of 
secret documents or agreements that 
could contain undisclosed condition-
alities (Booth 2003a: 51). ActionAid 
mentions the President’s Report of the 
World Bank, the Tranche Release 
Memoranda and the early drafts of 
the CAS but particularly the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) (ActionAid USA/ActionAid 
Uganda 2004: 13). This document, not 
available to the public and not even to  
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the government of the borrowing 
country, had much greater influence 
on the World Bank’s lending deci-
sions than the PRSP because it rates, 
according to ActionAid, “the extent to 
which a government has embraced 
‘neoliberal’ policy and institutional 
reforms (e.g. liberalization, privatiza-
tion, fiscal austerity)” (ActionAid 
USA/ActionAid Uganda 2004: 23). 
The international NGO questions that 
there is much leeway for input from 
CSOs in the PRSP consultations. “The 
rigidity of the CPIA may well under-
mine any possible flexibility for pos-
sibilities within the PRSP” (ActionAid 
USA/ActionAid Uganda 2004: 19). 
Stewart and Wang (2003: 27) con-
clude, “when it comes to macro-
policies, it appears that there is no 
national empowerment through the 
PRSP process” (see also Alexander 
2004: 3; CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 
2004a: 2). 
12. Ownership remains to be de-
sired. The new participatory approach 
has not only a right on its own; it is 
also expected to deliver ‘broad na-
tional ownership’. In view of the 
above mentioned perception of CSOs 
on their role in the process, it is not 
surprising that progress in this re-
spect remained limited. While the 
approach generated in many coun-
tries relatively strong ownership in a 
narrow circle of official stakeholders, 
this did not become true for civil soci-
ety (IMF/IEO 2004: 75). But even in 
governments and administrations, 
ownership was not undivided. UNDP 
(2003: 25) observes: “Typically, one 
part of the government has strong 
ownership of the PRSP at the expense 
of others.” It appears that most PRSPs 
are at best government-owned. Where 
they are ‘owned’ in a broader sense, 
they coincide with a sort of national 
project for poverty reduction that 
existed in the pre-PRSP-era and that is 
promoted by political leaders and 
shared by most groups of society.  
In search for reasons for the 
lack of ownership in many PRSP 
countries some observers point to the 
“pronounced power asymmetry be-
tween the IFIs and the countries” 
(World Bank 2002: 9). The IFIs expect 
countries’ authorities and other stake-
holders to set targets and to show 
commitment; at the same time they 
expect them to follow guidelines and 
timetables produced in Washington 
(World Bank 2004: 6). “There are clear 
tensions between the Bank in its role 
as both advisor and endorser of a 
country’s PRSP and the national gov-
ernment, which is supposed to have 
ownership of the strategy” 
(CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 2004 : 
15). Cling and others (2003a: 158ff) 
call the principles of ownership and 
conditionality (executed via the PRGF 
and the PRSCs) “antithetic”, Alexan-
der (2004: 5) terms it an “irresolvable 
contradiction”. For Ear-Dupuy (2004: 
27) “the question of ownership and 
the country-driven nature of the PRSP 
(…) still remains elusive”; Alexander 
(2004: 6) calls country ownership in 
the PRSP process “a mirage”.” An 
assessment of whether the PRSC is a 
vehicle of “Continuity or Change” 
(Wood 2005: 3) concludes that “the 
large number of benchmarks ring 
alarm bells – raising the fear that the 
World Bank wished to continue to 
micro manage economies.”  
The confusion about ‘owner-
ship’ is perhaps also due to different 
concepts of its meaning. Wood (2004a: 
34) cites the World Bank (with its 
Adjustment Lending Retrospective: 
Final Report, 2001: 73) defining own-
ership as “a concept that denotes a 
high probability that the policy and 
institutional changes associated with 
a lending operation will be adopted 
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and implemented even if there is in-
ternal opposition.” This definition, 
Wood points out, contrasts “dramati-
cally” with the understanding of most 
civil society organizations. They tend 
towards a deeper definition that sees 
‘national ownership’ as the result of 
an inclusive process, “ideally built 
from the bottom up.” Whereas the 
IFIs try to reach an agreement with 
the government which is then “sold to 
the public”, for civil society organiza-
tions authorship of a program of pol-
icy actions should rest with the coun-
try, thus “policy being debated and 
decisions taken at the country level.” 
(Wood 2004a: 34f.; see also McGee 
and others 2002: 4) 
13. Participation in implementa-
tion and monitoring of PRS has been very 
weak. In the vast majority of countries 
participation procedures concentrated 
on strategy development and PRSP 
formulation; participation in imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) was more or less neglected 
(World Bank 2002: 16; Cling and oth-
ers 2003b: 198; Trócaire 2004: 23)—a 
phenomenon that has been popularly 
coined as “participation gap” in PRS 
implementation (e.g. GTZ 2005: 42). 
Hughes and Atampugre (2005: 12) see 
challenges for participation increase 
“in the post-policy formulation phase 
when real power and resources be-
come involved.” This appraisal is 
perhaps also due to different ideas on 
what participation in this phase of the 
PRS process should include: provision 
of monitoring information, co-sharing 
the control over an evaluation process 
or even involvement in the identifica-
tion and implementation of corrective 
measures? In any case, PRSP related 
activities waned (as mentioned above) 
once the PRSP was written and HIPC- 
and PRGF-requirements were ful-
filled. Referring to 23 countries, Egulu 
(2004: 4) reports that not a single trade 
union participated in program im-
plementation, monitoring or evalua-
tion. Typically M&E was conceived as 
‘poverty monitoring’, as a way of 
gathering data. Thus participation 
was confined to a one-way ‘informa-
tion sharing’. Holvoet and Renard 
(2005: 27) developed M&E scores (1 = 
weak; 2 = partially satisfactory; 3 = 
satisfactory) to analyze PRSPs and 
Annual Progress Reports (APRs). 
They found for 11 sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries that parliament partici-
pation in M&E scored 1.64, civil soci-
ety participation 2.00 and donors 1.55. 
They comment: “Revealingly, the role 
of parliament is not mentioned in half 
of the cases. (…) In most countries 
studied there is a token of civil society 
participation of M&E, but this role is 
not institutionalized and remains very 
much ad-hoc.” 
In a minority of countries, ob-
servers found encouraging examples: 
In Tanzania and Mozambique, an 
institutional framework for monitor-
ing was set up (World Bank 2004: 14), 
in Uganda the Debt Network made 
path breaking efforts to create com-
mittees at the district level to monitor 
the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) 
(McGee and others 2002: 22) and the 
“Progress of Implementation”-Report 
of the IFIs gives account of “participa-
tory mechanisms, including citizens’ 
report cards and participatory budg-
eting tools, [that] have been devel-
oped to promote the institutionaliza-
tion of citizen feedback into periodic 
PRS assessments. Examples include 
the multi-stakeholder impact monitor-
ing systems in Ethiopia and Kenya; 
local-level NGO sectoral information 
networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
and a coalition of NGO, academic, 
research, and media organizations 
that was formed to track and report 
on budget implementation in Alba-
nia” (World Bank/IMF 2004: 19). 
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Other observers are more skep-
tical about success stories. With refer-
ence to Ethiopia, Wood (2004: 23) 
reports that all attempts by civil soci-
ety to check the implementation of the 
PRSP were limited by the lack of 
meaningful indicators, data and in-
formation. “Whilst on the paper it is a 
fully monitored PRSP, in reality there 
is little that civil society can comment 
on due to a lack of transparency.” 
Pointing to the example of Senegal, 
Woods finds that monitoring and 
evaluation is hampered by the lack of 
appropriate tools that can be used at 
the community level. Monitoring and 
evaluation is largely a government-
driven process—this impression also 
prevails as far as the preparation of 
the APRs is concerned. Although 
APRs were expected to be open to all 
stakeholders in the process, a survey 
on twelve African countries found 
that only three governments engaged 
parliament as well as civil society 
stakeholders (Uganda, Burkina Faso, 
Niger), four presented the APR to 
CSOs (Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozam-
bique) and four governments pre-
sented it to neither group (Driscoll 
and Evans 2004a: 15). “The APRs are 
generally seen [by governments] as 
another onerous donor requirement” 
(Trócaire 2004: 5). 
Exploring reasons for the 
aforementioned “participation gap” is 
still at nascent state in the interna-
tional debate. Chaillods and Hallak 
(2004: 141–142) see lack of capacity of 
the actors involved as the key expla-
nation for waning participation dur-
ing PRS implementation. Further-
more, incoherent linkage between 
political and financial decentralization 
has left local stakeholders with new 
political leverage, but short of the 
required funds (Chaillods and Hallak 
2004: 103).  
Framework perspectives 
14. Minimum standards for mean-
ingful participation are missing. World 
Bank guidelines for civil society par-
ticipation are few and vaguely formu-
lated; IFIs and other donors have not 
yet developed minimum standards 
that have to be satisfied before a par-
ticipation exercise is classified ‘ac-
ceptable’. This is one reason why 
some donors laud a participatory 
process whereas other observers see 
serious flaws. Eberlei (2002; 2004) has 
proposed to consider participation 
meaningful if it is rights-based, inte-
grated in the political environment of 
a given country and if it has empow-
ered and legitimate stakeholders. In 
most cases these standards are at best 
partially fulfilled.  
15. An institutional framework for 
participation was missing in many cases. 
Following the World Bank’s Source-
book, participation should build as 
much as possible on existing gover-
nance and political systems (Tikare 
and others 2002: 239). However, ob-
servers report that reality was differ-
ent in many countries. Appropriate 
institutional frameworks lacked, 
thereby contributing to the failure to 
facilitate broad based participation 
processes and the poor quality of 
participation for those who were able 
to participate (Sanchez and Cash 2003: 
16). Sometimes caused by the urgency 
to fulfill the HIPC-terms at short no-
tice, “the participation process related 
to the formulation of the PRSP was 
conducted as an ad hoc exercise in 
most cases, not as one that would 
need to be sustained overtime” 
(IMF/IEO 2004: 30). But there were 
also positive examples: Uganda is 
said to have perhaps the most formal, 
institutionalized framework for par-
ticipation (CIDSE/Caritas Internation-
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alis 2004: 8  
 
and 25); the World Bank (Tikare and 
others 2002: 239) reports from Ghana 
that the PRSP process built on preced-
ing processes and developed mecha-
nisms to institutionalize participation 
on the macroeconomic-policy level. 
Experiences elsewhere, observers 
report, were mixed: While in Vietnam 
the lack of a clear legal framework for 
CSOs hindered participation (Sanchez 
and Cash 2003: 16), in Bolivia a na-
tional dialogue law increased the 
scope for citizen participation. In 
other countries, participation was 
approached in a fractured, ad hoc 
manner (Rwanda) or negotiated with 
government on an ongoing basis (Ma-
lawi, Honduras) (CIDSE/Caritas In-
ternationalis 2004: 8). It is not surpris-
ing that in many countries with no or 
only weak institutional frameworks 
for CSO participation and/or legal 
provisions for civic engagement, the 
participatory process lost momentum 
after strategy development and gov-
ernment–CSO relations returned to 
‘business as usual’ (McGee and others 
2002: 20).  
16. Participation processes have 
been hindered by a number of constraints, 
among others: time, capacity, communica-
tion, and urban-bias. Citing numerous 
country examples, all observers agree 
that time frames for consultation were 
too short and too rigid. The linkage of 
the PRSP to debt relief via the HIPC 
completion point led to a hurry and 
compromised the quality of participa-
tion. The problem diminished in more 
recent processes but did not disap-
pear. Stewart and Wang (2003: 13) 
mention the Catholic Relief Service 
which complained of being given only 
a day’s notice before consultation in 
Bolivia, Honduras and Cameroon. 
The time allowed for participants to 
analyze drafts submitted before com-
menting on them was inadequate in 
many cases (McGee and others 2002: 
7; Wood 2004: 20; Sanchez and Cash 
2003: 18; CIDSE/Caritas Internation-
alis 2004: 4; World Bank 2002: 20). The 
World Bank study (2004: 6) concludes 
that “the ambitious timetable initially 
set out by the World Bank and the 
Fund (…) discouraged experimenta-
tion in adapting the PRS process to 
country circumstances” (see also 
IMF/IEO 2004: 29). 
Observers also agree that many 
stakeholders lacked the skills, experi-
ences and resources to engage effec-
tively in the participation process. 
This was particularly true for smaller 
CSOs. But also larger CSOs suffered 
from “economic illiteracy” (ActionAid 
USA/ActionAid Uganda 2004: 13) as 
far as complex matters such as bud-
gets and macroeconomics were con-
cerned. There was a notorious lack of 
financial resources and high caliber 
staff to engage on details of policy 
options, to do research and elaborate 
alternative policy scenarios (World 
Bank 2002: 17; Driscoll and Evans 
2004: 9; IMF/IDA 2003a: 3f.; IMF/IEO 
2004: 4). In this situation, 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis (2004: 
5) report, “some CSOs were vulner-
able to being dictated to by funding 
NGOs, rather than maintaining con-
trol over their own agenda.” Others 
were anxious to be used legitimizing 
pre-determined policies they were 
opposed to (Sanchez and Cash 2003: 
21).  
Lack of strategic communica-
tion in PRS is seen as another obstruc-
tion to effective participation.        
Mozammel and Odugbemi (2005: 9) 
argue for the need of “mechanisms 
(…) for a two-way flow of informa-
tion and ideas between the govern-
ment and the citizenry”. The most 
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reported barrier in this context is lan-
guage. The choice of language—
English—limited civil society partici-
pation by excluding crucial decision-
makers, rural and minority popula-
tions and it imposed not at least for-
eign ways of thinking (Stewart and 
Wang 2003: 14; World Bank 2002: 
10f.). It is noteworthy that the drafts 
of the PRSP in Nicaragua and Cam-
bodia were first prepared in English 
and discussed by foreigners (Sanchez 
and Cash 2003: 16). Egulu (2004: 5) 
cites a trade union representative of 
the Central African Republic who in 
preparing for a seminar had contacted 
the government for a copy of the 
PRSP. “The official answer was that 
such a document did not exist (…) 
whereas this document can be found 
(in English) on the IMF’s website.” 
Trócaire (2004: 4) deplores that most 
governments made inadequate efforts 
“to communicate with the broader 
public in accessible formats”, not only 
by using local languages but also by 
community radio and visual aids. 
There are, however, also positive ex-
amples. McGee and others (2002: 21) 
cite the booklet “Tanzania without 
poverty: A plain-language guide to 
the PRSP”, produced in English and 
several national languages, as an “ex-
cellent example of the popularizing 
and demystifying of complex policy 
message to inform the public about 
the PRSP” (for Yemen see IMF/IDA 
2003: 8; for Uganda World Bank 2002: 
243).  
In many countries, the partici-
pation process was an urban- and 
sometimes even capital-biased exer-
cise, dominated by urban-based 
CSOs; rural and particularly remote 
areas were neglected, despite having 
the highest incidence of poverty there, 
report observers (Oxfam International 
2004: 8; Booth 2003a: 29; Stewart and 
Wang 2003: 14; DFID 2004: 22).  
 
4.  The International Debate: 
Recommendations 
Convinced that participatory 
PRS processes had many flaws so far 
but also mark a significant improve-
ment over past processes and bear an 
enormous potential, most contribu-
tors to the debate make a range of 
recommendations to improve the 
approach and its realization. There is, 
however, a minority of critics who 
mark out to CSOs to consider whether 
it is wise to take part in an exercise 
that could lend false legitimacy to 
pre-determined policies they are op-
posed to (e.g. Alexander 2004: 12; 
ActionAid USA/ActionAid Uganda 
2004: 4). Without being exhaustive, 
the following presents an overview of 
some important recommendations 
and demands. 
Stakeholder perspectives 
- Decision-making on all PRS-
related issues should be in the 
country—not in Washington. Par-
ticipation in PRS should not be 
confined to social questions; 
also a debate on macroeco-
nomic questions should be 
opened up. If PRS participation 
is to be meaningful, participa-
tion processes also have to deal 
with macroeconomics. It is not 
only imperative that documents 
such as drafts of PRGFs and 
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PRSCs as well as important 
documents associated with 
structural adjustment policies 
are released timely, PRSPs and 
their policy should no longer be 
overridden by other agreements 
between governments and IFIs. 
Secrecy should have no place in 
a process that heavily relies on 
transparency (Oxfam Interna-
tional 2004: 10; Trócaire 2004: 4; 
Egulu 2004: 12; Ear-Dupuy 
2004: 29). “Bank and Fund 
[should] locate more policy-
makers on the ground and for 
decisions on PRSPs, PRSCs and 
PRGF programs to be agreed at 
country level in the context of a 
multi-stakeholder PRSP forum” 
(CIDSE 2004: 26). 
- The participatory process should be 
more encompassing and engage the 
really poor and vulnerable. Repre-
sentativity of stakeholders in 
the process has to be improved 
and handpicked selection of 
government favorites avoided. 
The integration of parliaments 
and political parties should be 
aimed at. Above all, serious at-
tempts are to be made to in-
volve (more) poor people, par-
ticularly women. Country spe-
cific minimum standards for 
participation could be helpful 
and form the basis of an as-
sessment at the end of PRS cycle 
(Oxfam International 2004: 9f.).  
Process perspectives 
- To enable stakeholders to make 
meaningful contributions to the 
process, efforts in capacity building 
should be intensified. In order to 
extend participation beyond 
PRSP formulation, practical 
monitoring and evaluation tools 
should be developed and made 
available to the poor, especially 
on the community level. In-
formed participation on macro-
economic issues is only possible 
if the ‘knowledge gap’ between 
IFIs and governments on one 
side and CSOs on the other can 
be filled (Currah 2004: 6; Wood 
2004: 24; Sanchez and Cash 
2003: 17). 
- Participation should go beyond the 
elaboration of PRSPs. The par-
ticipatory process needs to start 
with the PRS design, but should 
be considered equally impor-
tant when it comes to imple-
mentation, when annual re-
views are scheduled and reap-
praisals are to be made. Partici-
pation should be more than 
consultation in the initial stage 
of program development 
(Thornton and Cox 2005: 26; 
Booth 2003a: 23; Ear-Dupuy 
2003: 29). As participation needs 
time to be meaningful the time-
table should be generous but 
clear. Artificial deadlines 
should be avoided (Sanchez 
and Cash 2003: 23). 
Framework perspectives 
- Participation should be strength-
ened by the establishment of a per-
manent framework. To become ef-
fective and sustainable, a 
framework for participation has 
to be set up that takes into ac-
count the normal policymaking 
processes of the country and its 
electoral cycles (Sanchez and 
Cash 2003: 23; Oxfam Interna-
tional 2004: 10; CIDSE/CI 2004a: 
28). Participation should build 
on clear legal provisions that 
define the scope of stakeholder 
involvement. Governments 
should clarify the ‘rules of the 
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game’ for the participatory 
process and how requests for 
public actions will be handled 
(IMF/IDA 2003: 43; IMF/IDA 
2003a: 12).  
- A development or PRS forum 
should be set up. To ensure broad 
stakeholder involvement and to 
improve country ownership a 
forum should be established 
that comprises government, 
parliament, civil society, donors 
and IFIs on an equal footing. 
This forum should be entitled to 
make key decisions concerning 
design, implementation, moni-
toring and reporting of the PRS 
process (Trócaire 2004: 4; 
CIDSE/Caritas Internationalis 
2004: 16). 
- In general, the institutionalization 
of frameworks for participation 
should be pushed by the introduc-
tion of minimal standards that in-
clude rights and structures for 
an ongoing cooperative dia-
logue between legitimated and 
capacitated stakeholders   
(Eberlei 2002; 2004).  
 
  
Participation in PRS Revision Processes 
Walter Eberlei 
1.  Summary 
Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(PRS) are scheduled to be revised 
after an implementation period of 
three to five years. As of now, only 
five countries, namely Uganda, Tan-
zania, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Nica-
ragua, have completed their revision 
processes and have come up with a 
second-generation strategy. But nu-
merous countries are scheduled to 
revise their PRS within the next 24 
months. The question arises as to 
whether the experience in the early 
country cases offers insights into how 
societal participation can take place in 
this phase of the PRS policy cycle. In 
all five countries with a completed 
second-generation PRS, societal par-
ticipation was a significant element 
during the revision. Compared with 
the preparation phase of the first PRS 
in these countries, participation has 
improved in terms of both quantity 
and quality. Guidelines for participa-
tion (in Uganda and Tanzania) or at 
least an outline for the process to 
come (in Burkina Faso, Ghana) have 
been developed to help structure the 
process and provide the various 
stakeholders with a better information 
basis about the process and opportu-
nities to participate. A more generous 
time frame in all five countries, some 
form of institutionalization of dia-
logue fora (Uganda, Tanzania, Nica-
ragua, Ghana), more advance infor-
mation, decentralized consultation 
mechanisms (Ghana, Tanzania), a 
better organized and interlinked civil 
society and other factors have con-
tributed to an improved environment 
for participation. Despite these posi-
tive developments, a number of 
shortcomings have to be mentioned, 
among them: little participation by 
elected bodies (except Ghana), priori-
tization behind closed doors (Burkina 
Faso) or at least in separate processes 
(Tanzania), a strong donor influence. 
The most crucial point might be that 
the inclusion of poor and very poor 
strata of society will remain a big 
challenge for some time to come. The 
paper ends with some proposals for 
first steps of a participatory PRS revi-
sion process.  
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2.  Introduction – The Idea and Reality of PRS 
Revisions 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) process is organized as a policy 
cycle. The drafting and approval of 
PRSPs is followed by implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation, and – 
after about three to five years – by a 
revision process and the development 
of a new PRSP, at which point the 
cycle begins again (IMF/World Bank 
2004: 1).  
This roll-over principle is one 
of the innovative elements of the PRS 
approach. The other one is to inte-
grate societal participation as a key 
element throughout the PRS policy 
cycle. Both principles are designed to 
provide the basis for an ongoing so-
cietal learning process on poverty 
issues and poverty reduction efforts. 
The quality of participatory PRS revi-
sions is, therefore, not only one im-
portant step among others in the PRS 
process of a country, but a crucial test 
of its overall approach to realizing its 
poverty reduction efforts. 
To organize and to implement a 
PRS revision process, however, seems 
to be a difficult undertaking. 22 coun-
tries produced their PRSP before the 
30th September 2002 (most of them 
with a maturity of three years). Actu-
ally, only five out of this group  
(Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Ghana, Nicaragua) have completed 
the cycle by now – all five countries 
published their second generation 
strategy about five years after the first 
full PRSP has been finalized. At global 
level, the PRS revision phase and the 
development of a “second genera-
tion” PRS are scarcely discussed. It is 
interesting to note that the report on 
the otherwise quite comprehensive 
IMF/World Bank 2005 PRS Review 
(IMF/World Bank 2005) does not men-
tion the revision processes with a 
single word. Looking at the literature 
on PRS, the same picture emerges: 
apart from just one paper that at least 
mentions the issue and outlines a few 
general ideas (Driscoll/Evans 2005), 
no analysis of the topic is available. 
The analytical framework for 
this paper builds on the author’s pre-
vious work on institutionalized par-
ticipation in processes beyond the 
PRSP and an approach to define 
minimum standards for a meaningful 
participation in PRS processes. Four 
aspects have been identified as crucial 
to a more facilitating or more inhibit-
ing environment for participation: 
structures, legal conditions ensuring 
societal participation, the legitimacy 
of the organizations/institutions in-
volved, and the ability of actors to 
engage (see introductory article in this 
INEF Report).  
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3.  Overview: Participatory PRS Revisions so 
far 
Five countries (Burkina Faso, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Nicaragua) 
have finalized their PRS review pro-
cesses so far. The government of Tan-
zania initiated a broad-based review 
process in late 2003, which led to the 
new strategy that was launched in 
2005. This process has been chosen as 
a case study and will be described in 
chapter 4. 
Uganda 
Since the introduction of the 
PRS approach, Uganda has been at 
the forefront of the initiative. In fact, 
Uganda´s first Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP) was launched as 
far back as 1997. The first revised 
PEAP in the year 2000 was quickly 
accepted by the IMF and the World 
Bank as the country´s  full PRSP. This 
means that Uganda is the only coun-
try that has passed through two revi-
sion processes already – one in 
1999/2000 and one in 2004/2005. In 
December 1999, the government pre-
sented a draft for a revised PEAP. 
Non-governmental stakeholders were 
explicitly invited to participate in the 
discussion process on the formulation 
of a new PEAP. Numerous actors 
accepted this offer (see Eberlei 2003; 
Panos 2002: 33). Both donors and civil 
society actors involved lauded the 
2000 process as being highly partici-
patory.  
The submission of the Poverty 
Status Report 2003 by the government 
and a new extensive and participa-
tory-surveyed Poverty Report by  
UPPAP are regarded as preparatory 
steps towards a new revision process 
2004 (see Ssewakiryanga 2005). A 
PEAP Revision Guide, describing the 
process, was compiled. Halfway into 
2003, the revision process was 
launched with a national workshop. 
Besides consultations within the exist-
ing sector working groups, provisions 
were made for independent civil soci-
ety consultations as well as consulta-
tions at the level of local governments 
and within the private sector. The 
members of the sector working 
groups as well as other actors were 
represented in four newly-established 
working groups aligned to the four 
pillars of the PEAP (sustainable eco-
nomic growth, good governance, in-
creasing incomes of the poor, improv-
ing quality of life of the poor). Hence, 
civil society was represented in all 
PEAP revision committees and there-
fore actively involved. One example 
that is documented quite well is the 
so-called PEAP Gender Team, formed 
by representatives of government 
(several ministries), the civil society 
and the donor community. The team 
contributed specific gender analytical 
work as well as numerous proposals 
to mainstream gender into the PEAP 
(Ssewarkiryanga 2005: 303 f.).  
According to Piron and Norton 
(2004: 37), the recent review process 
has been more open and better orga-
nized than the prior; even civil society 
seemed to be better prepared. Strong 
NGO networks, particularly the 
Uganda Debt Network (UDN) and the 
NGO Forum, strengthen the voice of 
the emerging civil society in Uganda. 
While civil society hardly participated 
in the formulation of the first PEAP, 
its revision in 2000 granted those 
networks, international NGOs as well 
as religious groups and research insti-
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tutes a say for the first time (see Eber-
lei 2003). Since then, the inclusion of 
civil society actors has been gradually 
extended. Civil society organizations 
worked together closely. To coordi-
nate their input into the revision 
process, civil society organizations 
formed a CSO PEAP Revision Steering 
Committee with 16 organizations as 
members, among them the NGO Fo-
rum (chair) and UDN.1 Through local 
consultations, the CSO committee 
tried to weave the perspectives of the 
poor into the process: About 2500 
people (among them 47 percent 
women) attended meetings and 
workshops organized by the commit-
tee in the course of the revision pro-
cess. The CSO group produced a 
number of papers on specific topics 
related to the PEAP as well as a com-
prehensive document with a number 
of proposals and demands regarding 
the four PEAP pillars (CSO PEAP 
Revision Liason Office 2004). Beside 
this coordinated participation of 
CSOs, the trade union’s umbrella 
organization NOTU (see Egulu 2004b) 
as well as environmental NGOs and 
other groups were also involved in 
PEAP consultations. 
After the finalization of the re-
view process, the PRSP II (actually the 
third PEAP generation) was presented 
to the boards of the IMF and the 
World Bank in July 2005. IMF and 
World Bank praised the revised strat-
                                                     
1  Other members were a few interna-
tional NGOs like Oxfam and Care, but mainly 
Ugandan CSOs or civil society networks like 
the Forum for Women in Democracy (FO-
WODE), Eastern African Sub-regional Support 
Initiative for the Advancement of Women 
(EASSI), Uganda Society for Disabled Children, 
Community Development and Resource Net-
work (CDRN), Council for the Economic Em-
powerment of Women in Africa (CEEWA), 
Uganda Child Rights NGO Network. It should 
be noted that women’s organizations were well 
represented in the committee. 
egy and the “extensive consultations” 
on which the new paper was based 
(IDA/IMF 2005a: 1f.). 
Burkina Faso 
While the PRS revision process 
in Uganda is documented quite well, 
only limited independent information 
is available on the process in Burkina 
Faso. Like Uganda and Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso presented its first PRSP 
in the year 2000 and the PRSP II in 
2005. There has been a lot of criticism 
that societal participation during for-
mulation of the first PRSP was con-
ceivably weak. A study on behalf of 
the IMF concluded, for example, that 
“the PRSP was drafted by a small 
group in government with assistance 
of a few donors (...) Both the Bank and 
the Fund Boards discussed whether 
Burkina Faso’s PRSP should be con-
sidered as an interim rather than a full 
PRSP on the grounds of limited par-
ticipation” (Robb/Scott 2001: 28). 
In order to improve the partici-
pation of stakeholders during the PRS 
revision process 2003-2004, the gov-
ernment initiated an iterative proce-
dure built upon broad-based consul-
tation. It consisted of stocktaking 
workshops, meetings with the heads 
of ministerial departments on the 
consistency of sectoral policies, in-
formation sessions with technical and 
financial partners, a civil society fo-
rum on rereading the PRSP, and a 
national conference between April 
2003 and early 2005. Finally, the re-
vised version of the PRSP was pre-
sented to the Economic and Social 
Council, which is comprised of repre-
sentatives of public administration, 
private sector, and civil society (GoBF 
2004: 5).  
A variety of societal stake-
holders participated in all consulta-
tions carried out in the PRSP II pro-
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cess, namely: women’s organizations, 
research institutes, labor organiza-
tions, religious organizations, human 
rights organizations and those with 
specific demands, private media, 
NGOs and development associations 
(among them the Permanent Secre-
tariat of NGOs, SPONG, the Liaison 
Office for NGOs and Associations, 
and the Networks for Communica-
tion, Information, and Training of 
Women in NGOs), youth movements, 
marginalized persons, farmers’ or-
ganizations, and cultural and artistic 
organizations, private-sector repre-
sentatives under the auspices of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Crafts (GoBF 2003: 71, GoBF 2004: 5). 
A civil society forum held in Ouaga-
dougou in July 2003 lauded the gov-
ernment for involving them in the 
revision process, but criticized the 
“low level of involvement of grass-
roots communities” and demanded 
that the government should involve 
civil society groups not only from 
time to time but on “a lasting basis” 
(GoBF 2004: 10). 
There is no independent aca-
demic research report available that 
could give more insight into the  
Burkinian PRS process and its partici-
patory character. A consultancy re-
port on behalf of the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
(BMZ) and the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) concluded that 
civil society was “appropriately rep-
resented” during the consultation 
process, but criticized that non-state 
actors were not “capable of making a 
methodological-instrumental or con-
ceptual contribution to the regional 
strategy papers or the second PRSP”. 
And even more: "In fact, the weak 
civil-society organization meant that 
they could not even agree on any kind 
of concerted approach before passage 
of the second PRSP in September 
2003. Although in comparison to 
phase 1 there was far more room for 
participation by social actors in the 
revision of the first PRSP and the re-
worked second PRSP, this opportu-
nity was not seized. The civil-society 
organizations lacked the required 
technical capacities; the private sector 
showed no interest in this process” 
(GTZ 2004: 5). Although this criticism 
seems to be a bit shortsighted (it does 
not, for example, mention the joint 
civil society statement published in 
July 2003), it points at the weak state 
of civil society and private sector ac-
tors in Burkina Faso as such. 
Despite the obvious fact that 
government offered space for consul-
tation and that non-state actors were 
too weak to use this space fully, there 
is also some civil society criticism 
stating that the executive defined its 
priorities behind closed doors (INEF 
2005: 18). This is confirmed by the 
above-mentioned BMZ/GTZ report 
with regard to the important opera-
tionalization process that followed the 
overall PRS revision in Burkina Faso: 
“The operational plan PAP (Priority 
Action Program) was given to the 
donor community for comment in 
mid-January. The operational plan 
was drawn up almost exclusively by 
the Directorate General for Economy 
and Planning (DGEP), which is the 
planning department of the Ministry 
of Economy and Development; no 
other ministries except the Ministry of 
Finance and Budget (MFB) partici-
pated. The civil society and the pri-
vate sector were not even informed 
about this new implementation 
document” (GTZ 2004: 6). 
In their comments on the new 
Burkinian PRSP, IMF and World Bank 
welcomed the “wider involvement of 
civil society” and “the broader debate 
on poverty reduction” (IDA/IMF 2005: 
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2, 7) – but without furnishing any 
proof or quoting examples. 
Ghana 
After three years into imple-
mentation, the review process started 
in September 2004 with the launch of 
thematic working groups and ended 
with the presentation of the document 
in early 2006. CSOs have been invited 
to participate in the thematic working 
groups (“Cross-Sectoral Planning 
Groups”, CSPG). These groups – 
originally five, later merged to three 
on the basis of the priorities of the 
Government, namely Private Sector 
Competitiveness, Human Resource De-
velopment and Good Governance – were 
composed of state actors (ministries, 
departments, agencies) and non-state 
actors (professional bodies, research 
institutions, NGOs, trade unions, 
associations of specific interest groups 
and others), finally development part-
ners. The working groups were 
chaired by an individual selected by 
the group and facilitated by a consul-
tant, assisted by a research associate 
(NDPC 2005: 10). Each CSPG formed 
a core working group. Terms of refer-
ence for the CSPG were formulated 
by the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC), the government 
unit being in charge of the PRS pro-
cess. Additionally, a broad based con-
sultation process was initiated. After 
the government presented a draft 
version in 2005, a number of consulta-
tive meetings and workshops took 
place at national level as well as in all 
ten regions of the country. According 
to the government, all relevant stake-
holders were invited to these public 
meetings. In the final document, a list 
of consulted stakeholders as well as a 
list of consultative activities between 
September 2004 and November 2005 
are mentioned (NDPC 2005: 12-13). 
Beside societal stakeholders, NDPC 
involved also the parliament, espe-
cially the Poverty Reduction Committee 
(zero draft been submitted to the Par-
liament in April 2005, workshop for 
Parliamentary select committee in 
June and August 2005; submission of 
final version in early 2006). Based on 
the PRS-II, the development of District 
Medium-Term Development Plans have 
been completed in 2006. A range of 
consultative meetings and workshops 
as well as the final approval of these 
plans by the district assemblies have 
been organized to ensure a broad-
based participatory approach. 
While civil society groups were 
initially quite reluctant to become 
involved in the process (INEF 2005), a 
number of organizations attended 
workshops and meetings or partici-
pated in the CSPGs. Representatives 
of civil society groups who have been 
involved in the first PRS process al-
ready confirmed that the revision 
process was more inclusive and par-
ticipatory than the first PRS drafting 
process. However, a number of criti-
cal voices – raised by various repre-
sentatives of societal groups and the 
Parliament – point to various short-
comings in the process.2 Frequently 
mentioned are: invitations to work-
shops on very short notice; lack of 
clear time schedule tabled early 
enough to get busy people involved; 
very tight time table, too limited time 
to prepare substantial input; gap be-
tween analysis and conclusions for 
the policy (e.g. with regard to gen-
der); selected invitations to meetings; 
parliamentary involvement too late; 
high influence of consultants paid by 
government; no clarity about how 
inputs will impact the document;  lack 
                                                     
2  Personal communication; interviews in 
February/March 2006 in the northern and cen-
tral region as well as in Accra. 
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of clear terms of reference for in-
volvement; no grassroots consulta-
tion. 
Nicaragua 
Nicaragua’s PRSP-II has been 
accepted by the boards of the IMF and 
the World Bank in 2006. According to 
an IMF/World Bank assessment, the 
Nicaraguan process confirms the ex-
perience made in the other countries  
 
that the quality and the extent of par-
ticipation has been improved in the 
revision process compared with the 
first PRS generation (see box 1). While 
the few available independent voices 
confirm that a number of consultative 
activities have taken place in the 
Nicaraguan review process, there is 
quite some doubt that voices of the 
poor have been heard and that the 
consultations offered more than a 
“signing-off process" (Hayes/Kovach 
2006: 3). 
 
 
Box 1:  Nicaragua: Participation in Elaborating the PRSP-II 
Nicaragua has produced its new National Development Plan 2005-2009 
that has been accepted in 2006 by the boards of the IMF and the World Bank as 
PRSP-II. The Bank/Fund Staff Advisory Note states: 
“The PRSP-II emerged from a broad participatory process at the local 
level with departmental development councils, and consultations at the sectoral 
level. Consultations for the PRSP-II took place in four stages through a series of 
seventeen workshops at the departmental level to ensure civil society participa-
tion including the private sector and donors. This process incorporated the dis-
semination in 2003 of the Vision of Nation and the PPND, and in 2004 of the 
PNDO. The consultation of the PRSP-II culminated at the national level with the 
discussion of the National Development Plan 2005–2009 in August of 2005 at 
the National Commission for Economic and Social Planning (CONPES). The 
authorities have also held bilateral meetings on the strategy laid out in the 
PRSP-II with the National Assembly’s PRSP Commission. The PRSP-II and 
other relevant material to the PRSP under the revised strategy are posted on the 
National Development Plan website www.pnd.gob.ni and at the Office of the 
President’s website www.presidencia.gob.ni. 
The participatory process of elaborating the PRSP-II comprised the pro-
duction of territorial plans, and the discussion of sectoral priorities and policy 
matrices. Territorial plans were produced for all 15 departments and two 
autonomous regions, including actions, goals, targets and budgets, incorporat-
ing funding sources whenever possible. At the sectoral level, the government 
established six fora with donor participation to discuss sectoral priorities and 
elaborate policy matrices in education, health, social protection, governance, 
production and competitiveness, and infrastructure. 
(to be continued) 
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(continued) 
The PRSP-II incorporates demands voiced at the consultation sessions, 
such as increasing infrastructure investment, emphasizing participation and 
decentralization in PRSP-II implementation, increasing transparency in moni-
toring and evaluation, and improving alignment of donor contributions to 
PRSP-II goals. Discussions covered the four PRSP-II strategic areas and helped 
establishing the five overarching PRSP-II results for the period 2005–2009.” 
Source: IMF/World Bank 2005: Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper, Washington D.C., December 29, 2. 
 
4.  Country case: Tanzania 
Uganda and Tanzania are the 
two countries that have organized the 
most elaborated PRS revision pro-
cesses to date. As the participatory 
aspects of the two PRS review pro-
cesses in Uganda have been analyzed 
and documented already in more 
detail3, it was decided to choose the 
specific experience with participation 
in the PRS revision process of Tanza-
nia in 2004/05 as a case study for this 
paper. 
A.  Participation in the Tanza-
nian PRS process before the 
review 
Tanzania belongs to the small 
group of African countries that 
started the PRS process quite early on, 
although participation of societal 
stakeholders in designing the Interim- 
and Full-PRSP (in 2000) was very 
weak. Whereas the I-PRSP had been 
written without any civil-society par-
ticipation, the process was slightly 
                                                     
3  See for example Eberlei 2003 and 
Ssewakiryanga 2005 as well as the bibliograpy 
included in the VENRO country profile Uganda 
(http://www.prsp-watch.de/countries/uganda. 
php).  
different regarding the full PRSP. 
Various civil society actors—most 
notably at the national level—were 
involved. International NGOs (such 
as OXFAM) as well as church-based 
organizations played the leading role, 
while at regional workshops smaller 
NGOs (such as local women and 
youth networks) were invited to par-
ticipate (Evans and Ngalwea 2003: 
275). Notwithstanding the desired 
participation of Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs), the process 
was dominated by “the so-called in-
ternational NGOs” (Gould and 
Ojanen 2003: 8). Facing a critical re-
port by the Tanzania Coalition for Debt 
and Development (TCDD) on the mac-
roeconomic framework of the strat-
egy, the government blocked the lead-
ing role of the coalition in zonal 
workshops. “The subsequent final 
draft included hardly any input from 
the civil society” (Whitehead 2003: 
29). Furthermore, a systematic effort 
to assure the participation of employ-
ers and trade unions was missing at 
this stage (Casale 2004: 107).  
While hardly any participation 
in the implementation of the PRS is 
reported, societal stakeholders played 
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an increasing role in PRS monitoring. 
Since 2002, the annual Poverty Policy 
Week serves the purpose of an open 
forum, and thus provides a space for 
public debate on poverty reduction 
(Shariff Samji 2005: 62f.). Conse-
quently, civil-society actors (most 
notably big NGOs) engage in the de-
bate. This dialogue is based on the 
government’s Poverty and Human De-
velopment Report. Another forum to 
contribute to PRS monitoring is the 
participation of civil society in at least 
one open session of the Consultative 
Group Meetings between government 
and international donors (e.g. in De-
cember 2002; IMF/World Bank 2004). 
While the first Annual Progress Report 
has been widely criticized for passing 
the ability to include civil society into 
its formulation (Evans and Ngalwea 
2003: 278), the two follow-ups (2003 
and 2004), according to the govern-
ment, incorporated the societal stance 
through workshops and the afore-
mentioned Poverty Policy Weeks. Since 
December 2001 the annual Poverty 
Monitoring Master Plan delineates the 
diverse structure of the Tanzanian 
PMS and specifically describes the 
institutional framework for poverty 
monitoring. It includes the Poverty 
Monitoring Steering Committee with 
about 30 members representing key 
stakeholders; among those, civil soci-
ety representatives such as the Tanza-
nia Gender Network Programme 
(TGNP), the NGO-network Tanzania 
Association of NGOs (TANGO) and 
Save the Children (international NGO). 
Besides, various working groups such 
as the Dissemination, Sensitization and 
Advocacy Technical Working Group, 
which is not only responsible for dis-
seminating the results of poverty 
monitoring in Tanzania but also for 
doing so in a user-friendly format 
(e.g. releasing comprehensible infor-
mation in plain language) are part of 
the system. Some groups engage in 
independent participatory poverty 
monitoring (Hakikazi 2004) or other 
approaches related to the PRS; the 
gender-specific budget initiative by 
women’s organizations serves as one 
example (Mabina and Kiondo 2003: 8; 
Rusimbi 2003). 
Growing societal participation 
between 2000 and 2004 is one of the 
characteristics of the Tanzanian PRS 
process. Another one is the significant 
role of international donors. Accord-
ing to some observers they are the 
dominant players. Gould and Ojanen 
(2003: 7f.) go so far as to label the PRS 
a sole product of technocrats from 
both government and the donor 
community. Their foremost criticism 
is that donors escape democratic con-
trol, but others claim that the donor 
strategy, too, incorporates consulta-
tive elements (Evans and Ngalwea 
2003: 276). 
B.  Process perspective: How 
has participation been 
realized during the review? 
After three years of PRS im-
plementation, the country started the 
process to review and redraft the PRS. 
It was launched during the Poverty 
Policy Week in October 2003 after the 
government had already announced 
its plan to start the review six months 
earlier.4 The review process can be 
divided into three parts: 
                                                     
4  The following paragraphs on the Tan-
zanian PRS review process are based on the 
analysis of government documents (notably 
The United Republic of Tanzania 2004, 2005a 
and 2005b), further information released by 
government (http://www.povertymonitoring. 
go.tz), and a number of expert interviews with 
representatives from government, civil society 
and donors in September 2005.   
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First-Round Consultations took 
place during the months following the 
October 2003 event and included 
broad-based consultations at national, 
regional and local levels, some of 
which were led by government, oth-
ers by civil-society groups. The con-
cept for the various consultative ac-
tivities was developed by government 
in cooperation with some key stake-
holders at national level and was 
framed in specifically formulated 
consultation guidelines, based on 
clear principles: “The PRS review 
consultation aims at institutionalizing 
the participation process. The four 
standard principles, namely: rights, 
structures, legitimacy and capacity, will 
be adhered to” (The United Govern-
ment of Tanzania 2004: 4, see box 2; cf. 
Eberlei 2002, 2002a). Furthermore, the 
consultations were informed by a 
number of publications, e.g. by the 
results of the Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (PPA) 2002/03, an output 
of the Poverty Monitoring System (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2005b: 
20). The outcome of the consultations 
highlighted a number of issues re-
garding the poverty status, actual 
changes during PRS I implementa-
tion, remaining challenges (see The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2005a: 
22-34 for an overview) and were 
“consolidated into the first draft that 
was sent back to lead-stakeholders for 
scrutiny and comments” (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2005b: 19). Some 
civil-society representatives expressed 
a dissenting view on this in personal 
interviews: From their viewpoint, the 
new PRSP draft was outlined before 
the results came in and “some infor-
mation were picked later from the 
reports to validate the draft”. 
Second-Round Consultations star-
ted in August 2004 and ended  
with a national level consultation 
meeting on the 30th September 2004. 
During this round, the draft of the 
new PRSP was discussed to identify 
possible gaps, to build consensus and 
to foster ownership (a summary of the 
draft had been translated into Swahili, 
too). About fifty contributions (run-
ning to more than 700 pages) by vari-
ous stakeholders were submitted, 
including numerous proposals to 
adjust or change the first draft. While 
a government document stated that is 
was a difficult challenge for the PRS 
drafting team to accommodate the 
issues raised, it did not elaborate if 
and how this challenge would be 
managed (The United Government of 
Tanzania 2005a: 39). According to a 
passage in the final document, par-
ticularly the special needs of vulner-
able groups (e.g. people with disabili-
ties) and governance issues were 
given more weight by the influence of 
stakeholders in this consultation 
round (The United Government of 
Tanzania 2005b: 20). This was also 
confirmed by civil-society representa-
tives. Drafting team members came 
from government and hand-picked 
academia, but also included two rep-
resentatives from civil society.  
Third-Round Consultations took 
place in the Poverty Policy Weeks in 
November 2004 at national as well as 
at regional levels (five days in Dar es 
Salaam; one or two days in 13 re-
gions). This event was used to present 
the new strategy and to discuss the 
way forward (e.g. how to link the 
PRSP to the budget, how to prioritize 
the strategy, how to disseminate the 
document). 
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Box 2:  Tanzania: Consultation Guidelines 
The PRS review consultation will seek to employ some principles of a 
human rights approach to poverty reduction strategies. The PRS review consul-
tation aims at institutionalising the participation process.  The four standard 
principles namely rights, structures, legitimacy and capacity will be adhered to. 
Rights: The current PRS review strives to ensure that the consultation 
process by all the stakeholders are characterised by freedom of opinion, infor-
mation, media, association and campaigning. The stakeholders participate fully 
in the entire PRS cycle and the role of each stakeholder is clearly stipulated. 
Structures: Leading stakeholders ensure views are collected from the 
grass root level to the national level. The Government will ensure openness 
prevails throughout the process in terms of information as regards to PRS cycle. 
The implementation of PRS will be decentralized and each individual stake-
holder will have the role to contribute. 
Legitimacy: Parliament will fully be involved in the PRS process and will 
have the role to approve the PRSP.  The civil society organisations and other 
stakeholders have to organise and ensure that they are included in the process. 
Capacity: The PRS review process will entail capacity building for stake-
holders for them to effectively contribute in the PRS cycle. 
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania 2004: 4f.; similar in: The United Re-
public of Tanzania 2005b: 18. 
 
C.  Stakeholder perspective: 
Who participated, and to 
what extent? 
Even critical NGO representa-
tives confirm the broad-based and 
inclusive approach of the Tanzanian 
PRS review. Due to the multipronged 
approach, many voices from local to 
national levels representing the vari-
ous groups of the population have 
been heard. While the government-
led consultations concentrated on the 
stakeholders within government (e.g. 
the various ministries) as well as the 
donor community, most voices from 
sub-national level came in during the 
first phase through the consultations 
led by the Association of Local Authori-
ties of Tanzania (ALAT) and those led 
by various civil society groups.  
ALAT was chosen by the gov-
ernment to conduct consultations in 
168 villages located in 42 districts all 
over the country. All the ALAT-
initiated consultative meetings and 
workshops included representatives 
from local government and local as-
semblies as well as speakers from 
community-based organizations or 
local NGOs. More than 18,000 people 
attended (The United Republic of 
Tanzania 2005a: 15; no gender-specific 
differentiation). 
A number of civil society or-
ganizations or civil society networks 
active at national level took the lead 
to organize independent consultations 
(albeit within the framework of the 
jointly agreed review guidelines). 
Among this group are Hakakazi Cata- 
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lyst, NGOs Policy Forum (NPF), Tanza-
nia Gender Networking Programme 
(TGNP), and Tanzania Association of 
NGOs (TANGO) as well as more than 
30 other CSOs. Several thousand Tan-
zanians attended these independent 
PRS review meetings (usually no 
gender-specific differentiation; except 
TGNP-led consultations; it can be 
assumed that male participants 
formed the majority). Some of these 
“lead stakeholders” summarized re-
sults of different regional CSO consul-
tations or merged contributions of 
their member organizations into one 
paper, e.g. NPF and TANGO.  
 
Hakakazi Consultations in the 
Northern Region of Tanzania 
Hakakazi Catalyst organized a 
number of workshops at local and 
regional level. Around 1800 people 
participated (see Hakakazi 2004). 
Most important demands: more fun-
ding for social services (e.g. education 
and water), stronger rights to access 
land, intensified measures to fight 
corruption. The central message was 
formulated as follows: "Good Gov-
ernance is central to many issues, 
including for the effective develop-
ment and improvement of social ser-
vices such as education, health, water 
and roads, as well as for the manage-
ment of lands and natural resources" 
(Hakakazi 2004: 2). 
 
Private-sector actors were 
hardly involved in the process (they 
are not even mentioned in the respec-
tive revision papers) while trade un-
ions organized some independent 
consultations and submitted their 
own contribution to the PRS review 
(Egulu 2004b: 16 f.).  
Beside the consultative meet-
ings with stakeholders, the govern-
ment used mass media as well as leaf-
lets with questionnaires to get addi-
tional views from the general public: 
More than 22,000 responses (ques-
tionnaires) were received (among 
them: 36 percent women) and evalu-
ated statistically by the National Bu-
reau of Statistics. This evaluation was, 
however, questioned by some NGOs 
who thought that there was no capac-
ity to analyze the responses suffi-
ciently. 
The Parliament was hardly in-
volved in the PRS review consulta-
tions. Parliamentarians have only 
been informed through two work-
shops, but there was no systematic 
involvement. While some members of 
parliament are obviously interested in 
strengthening parliament’s role in the 
PRS process, the Speaker of Parlia-
ment did not see any necessity to 
change anything (personal communi-
cation). 
D.  Conclusions: Strengths and 
weaknesses of the 
Tanzanian PRS review 
Several strengths and weak-
nesses of the Tanzanian PRS review 
process can be identified:  
The government involved so-
cietal stakeholders actively in the 
process by offering funds for their 
own consultative processes. Civil-
society representatives are quite satis-
fied with the process and its outcome, 
especially when compared to the first 
PRS process in 2000. This has 
strengthened CSO ownership. As one 
representative of TANGO put it: “We 
are not invited – we are part of the 
process!”  
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The process was broad-based 
and inclusive. The approach to sup-
port non-governmental “lead stake-
holders” in organizing independent 
consultative meetings opened the 
process for a wide range of organiza-
tions, groups and politically involved 
individuals. Interviewees confirmed 
without exception that “whoever 
wanted to participate” was involved. 
The decentralized fora also offered 
access to people living in remote ar-
eas. This means that the criticized 
domination of a few international 
NGOs in the first phase of the PRS 
process in Tanzania (see Gould/ 
Ojanen 2003) has been replaced by a 
quite broad involvement of societal 
stakeholders during the revision 
process. 
The weaknesses associated 
with consultations for PRSP in 2000 
were analyzed upfront to avoid re-
peating the mistakes, e.g. “participa-
tory structures formed on an ad-hoc 
basis”, “women, youth, people with 
disabilities, the elderly, people living 
with HIV/AIDS, orphans were not 
adequately represented”, “inadequate 
analysis of ‘Voice of the poor’ through 
the zonal workshops” (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2004). Even 
lessons learnt during the review proc-
ess were openly formulated, e.g. “lim-
ited public awareness of PRS”, “short 
preparation time for facilitators”, 
“small samples of villages” (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2005a: 
21). This demonstrates an open atti-
tude towards learning.  
One of the mentioned weak-
nesses of the first round – the insuffi-
cient inclusion of gender issues in the 
PRS – has been taken up since then. 
Strong advocacy work of the civil 
society network TGNP pushed gov-
ernment to consider gender issues in 
the PRS process to be important (e.g. 
gender sensitive design of the PPA 
2002, including gender issues in the 
annual progress reports) (Bell 2003: 6, 
14 f.). 
The government proposed Re-
view Guidelines and negotiated the 
draft with civil society stakeholders. 
The final outcome (The United Re-
public of Tanzania 2004) formed the 
basis for the process including a clear 
institutional set-up. 
Rights-based approach: “The 
PRS review consultation will seek to 
employ some principles of a human 
rights approach to poverty reduction 
strategies” (The United Government 
of Tanzania 2004: 4; further elaborated 
in the document). 
The process was given ample 
time (the review was announced in 
May 2003, started in October 2003, 
and was finalized in November 2004).   
Stakeholder-led consultations 
were funded by government (with 
funds from UNDP and the World 
Bank). The downside of this funding 
would be that it could create some 
form of dependence, but Tanzanian 
stakeholders underlined the advan-
tages as they would not have been in 
a position to organize and to fund 
broad-based consultations on their 
own. According to several representa-
tives of non-state actors, they did not 
see any attempt by the government to 
influence them through the funding 
(personal communication). 
Government and other stake-
holders used various methods to ob-
tain responses from the broad public 
(flyers with a simple questionnaire, 
radio, television, website; art and 
drama, round-table meetings, group 
discussions, analytical studies...). This 
variety of communication instruments 
helped to create more public aware-
ness. Especially the use of radio pro-
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grams as well as art and drama is, 
furthermore, a way to include people 
with no or limited reading skills. This 
is helpful to women, for example, as 
their abilities to read and write are 
still below average. 
The Poverty Policy Week has 
been established as an institutional-
ized annual forum on poverty issues 
and is an important forum for the 
dialogue between government and 
stakeholders. 
As only a minority of Tanzani-
ans can speak or read English, it was 
helpful that several papers (e.g. the 
summary of the PRSP draft) were 
translated into Swahili and/or pub-
lished in “plain language”.5 
Non-governmental stake-
holders were not only consulted but 
also involved in the final drafting of 
the document. This extends societal 
participation from consultation to 
involvement in decision-making, al-
though the prioritization – and there-
fore: the final decision about what is 
done and what is not implemented – 
lies with the Government. 
To disseminate the strategy and 
to organize ongoing feedback, in 
other words: to institutionalize the 
dialogue between government and 
(civil) society, the government 
launched a PRS communication strat-
egy: “The primary aim is to enlist 
greater dialogue. This will be 
achieved through the institutionaliza-
tion of two-way communication be- 
 
                                                     
5  See for example a small booklet ex-
plaining the content of the revised Poverty 
Reduction Strategy: 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/ aplainlan-
guageguidetotanzaniasnationalstrategy.pdf; (or 
in Swahili): http://www.tzonline. 
org/pdf/mwongozowalugharahisiwamkakatiw
akukuzauchumi.pdf (access 26.11.06). 
tween government and other stake-
holders (...). The strategy will also 
ensure the availability and access of 
information on the implementation of 
the NSGRP at all levels (...)” (The 
United Government of Tanzania 2005: 
v). 
The overall assessment is posi-
tive, despite the fact that not all ideas 
and proposals were taken on board. 
Interview partners expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the governance 
chapter (e.g.: anti-corruption meas-
ures are seen as “lip service” only; 
some CSOs demanded more devolu-
tion of power from national to local 
authorities; some see too little empha-
sis on the fight against HIV/AIDS 
etc.). 
One very important weakness – 
the lack of priorities and the missing 
link to the budget – was formulated 
openly as a “critical challenge” for 
implementation (The United Republic 
of Tanzania 2005b: 22). This openness 
might contribute to overcoming the 
gap. However, some CSO representa-
tives fear that government will make 
all the important decisions without 
involving them. 
Another weakness is that sev-
eral processes are running parallel to 
the PRS process, e.g. the influential 
Public Expenditure Review (PER) pro-
cess. But this problem has been identi-
fied. Government intends to link PER 
and PRS stronger. Results are not yet 
clear. 
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5.  Conclusions 
Based on the early experience 
with PRS reviews in the above-
mentioned countries, the following 
conclusions can be summarized:   
Structures: 
Establishing permanent dialogue 
structures is definitely an important 
advantage. In Uganda and Tanzania, 
specific dialogue structures have been 
successfully established and institu-
tionalized. The sector working groups 
in Uganda, in which non-state stake-
holders are represented, played a 
central role in the review process of 
2003/2004; even prior to the second 
revision they were actively involved 
in the discussion of the annual budget 
and its implications for the poverty 
strategy. In Tanzania, the annual Pov-
erty Policy Week and also the PRS/PER 
groups give another example of a 
well-established dialogue basis. While 
Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana serve as 
good examples, the case of Burkina 
Faso is much weaker. In Burkina Faso, 
the dialogue structures between gov-
ernment and non-governmental ac-
tors are rather ambiguous, despite 
having been improved during the 
PRS process; yet they are far from 
fully established. The inclusion of 
societal stakeholders in the monitor-
ing system has a comparatively low 
ranking; currently, they can partici-
pate in sectoral working groups, but 
access to the decisive government 
committees is barred. 
Integrating permanent mecha-
nisms of monitoring informs the PRS 
review. The Uganda Participatory Pov-
erty Assessment Project (UPPAP) con-
stitutes an exemplary instrument of 
institutionalized participatory moni-
toring. UPPAP is designed in such a 
way as to enable the results to extend 
into the political decision-making 
processes concerned with the poverty 
reduction strategy of the PEAP. Many 
observers regard UPPAP as a helpful 
instrument to incorporate the voices 
of the poor in the political processes. 
In Tanzania, the outcome of the Pov-
erty Monitoring System was not as  
broad-based as in Uganda, but it also 
served as a source of information for 
review consultations. 
Rights: 
Developing a legal framework for 
the review process provides confidence. 
Government and non-state stake-
holders in Uganda as well as in Tan-
zania were able to agree in advance 
on guidelines for the PRS review 
process. In both cases, these guide-
lines formed a sort of legal framework 
– not in a juridical, but at least in a 
political sense.  
Legitimacy: 
Parliaments – the constitutional 
forum for societal participation – are still 
not involved in the PRS  processes. The 
review processes in Burkina Faso, 
Uganda and Tanzania did not totally 
by-pass the parliaments (members 
were usually informed through PRS-
related workshops); however, they 
did not involve the legislatives sys-
tematically (in Nicaragua, however, a 
Parliamentary Committee has dis-
cussed the draft). Only in Ghana, the 
parliament at national level has been 
involved in discussions (albeit within 
a tight timetable) and district assem-
blies have a say regarding the decen-
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tralized implementation plans. In all 
countries, capacity constraints, and 
also a limited traditional understand-
ing of parliament’s role in political 
processes, hinder a full inclusion. This 
practice weakens the legitimacy of the 
PRS process. 
Civil society networks are 
strengthening the legitimacy of PRS 
review processes. In Tanzania and 
Uganda, the civil society is active 
through strong civil society networks 
with a large membership. The same 
can be found in Zambia, but not in 
Ghana; the networks in Burkina Faso 
are also weak. 
The more the poor themselves are 
involved, the more legitimated are the 
PRS review processes in the eyes of or-
ganized stakeholders. The PRS review 
processes in Tanzania and Uganda 
involved “voices of the poor” system-
atically (e.g. UPPAP, Tanzania: local 
consultations, Participatory Poverty 
Assessments) and also integrated a 
gender dimension into these bottom-
up processes (e.g. by gender-specific 
evaluation of data, not only house-
hold-based indicators).  
Capacity: 
Meaningful participation by socie-
tal stakeholders needs financial support 
from donors and/or governments. Exam-
ple: In Tanzania, the government and 
donors funded the independent 
stakeholder-led consultations. This 
contributed significantly to a broad-
based and inclusive process. Financial 
support to strengthen especially civil-
society participation in revision pro- 
 
cesses was also given in Uganda by 
DFID, UNDP and others, in Zambia 
by GTZ and others. 
Including the poor in the PRS re-
views requires documents in their lan-
guage. Most PRS documents are writ-
ten and published in English. This is a 
clear indication that they are still pre-
dominantly written for the donor 
community, not for the indigenous 
(poor) populations. Using mass media 
in local languages – especially broad-
casting by radio (as done in the Tan-
zanian PRS review process) – should 
therefore be given much more atten-
tion (and resources). To translate key 
documents into the main local lan-
guages is a "must", although even 
written papers in the local language 
do not automatically include women 
at the same level. 
Including the poor means specific 
efforts to strengthen local, community-
based organizations – as “many smaller 
civil society organizations lack the 
skills, experience and resources to 
engage effectively in public-policy 
processes” (Driscoll/Evans 2005: 13). 
The Tanzanian example shows at least 
that offered consultation space at local 
level leads to the participation of 
these community groups – but with 
limited lasting effect as long as this 
space is not institutionalized: “Con-
sultations on poverty being seen as a 
one occasion exercise instead of being 
a living process” (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2005a: 21). Some NGOs 
demanded therefore the “devolution 
of power and resources to local lev-
els” (NGO Policy Forum 2004: 5).  
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6.  Getting started: Some conclusions for 
revision processes  
Some conclusions with regard 
to important first steps of a participa-
tory revision process can be drawn 
from the early experience.  
Identify the relevant stakeholders. 
A stakeholder analysis gives a clear 
picture of who has to be included in 
PRS activities (including specific 
strengths and comparative advan-
tages of stakeholders as not every 
stakeholder must or even can be in-
volved in every stage of the process). 
Learning from the experience of other 
countries, the analysis gives special 
attention to often underrepresented 
stakeholders (e.g. women’s groups, 
community-based organizations or 
other representatives of poor people) 
or neglected institutions (especially 
legislative bodies at national and local 
level). The stakeholder analysis is not 
done by the government alone, but is 
organized in a participatory way (e.g. 
by including all those stakeholders 
who are already active in the PRS 
process in the analytical exercise) and 
is handled as transparent and inclu-
sive as possible.  
Define the overall aims and goals. 
Before entering into a PRS revision 
process, the overall aims and goals of 
the process are discussed, defined and 
– in an ideal scenario – agreed upon 
by all relevant stakeholders (at least 
by all ‘leading’ stakeholders, espe-
cially cabinet or presidential office, 
the governmental unit being techni-
cally responsible for the PRS process, 
the relevant parliamentary commit-
tees, civil society networks, private 
sector networks or representative 
bodies). Aims should be considered 
with regards to the policy itself as 
well as for the process. For example: 
The overall aim for the policy outcome 
could be the (re-)prioritization of the 
strategy for the next phase; the aim 
for the process might be ensuring coun-
try ownership in a sense of broad 
support.6 Defining the overall aim for 
the process gives a clear picture what 
‘stakeholder participation’ shall mean 
in the revision process (e.g. consulta-
tion, elements of joint decision-
making, organizing public opinion 
building, informing a legislative deci-
sion). 
Analyze the starting point. Gov-
ernments invite stakeholders to re-
view the experience with the partici-
patory process during the formula-
tion, the implementation and the 
monitoring of the first PRS. The four 
dimensions of institutionalized par-
ticipation guide the analysis. The 
various stakeholder groups or even 
individual stakeholders develop their 
specific assessment of the previous 
processes and the state of participa-
tion. A simple SWOT-analysis helps 
to identify the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats for each of 
the four dimensions. Supported by an 
independent facilitator, the various 
governmental and societal stake-
                                                     
6  In the authors’ understanding, country 
ownership of poverty reduction strategies 
materializes when a majority of the population 
and their representatives (democratically le-
gitimated representatives as well as representa-
tives of societal pressure groups) participate in 
the development of the strategy, identify with 
the goals and elements of the strategy, and will 
participate in its implementation, monitoring 
and ongoing development (Eberlei 2001: 11). 
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holders discuss their (certainly) dif-
ferent assessments. This leads to a 
better understanding of perspectives 
at least; an ideal outcome would be an 
agreed common understanding of the 
experience with PRS so far. 
Define the institutional basis. The 
analysis of previous experience with 
participation is followed by an ex-
plicit, multi-stakeholder process of 
defining the institutional basis for the 
revision process. Structures are cre-
ated, e.g. joint working groups (on 
sectoral and cross-sectoral issues, 
specific priority areas or other as-
pects); a steering committee including 
representatives of the various stake-
holder groups; institutionalized and 
clearly defined ways of information. 
A jointly developed document de-
scribes the principles of the process; 
the roles and responsibilities for each 
stakeholder including their rights and 
obligations; the rules and procedures 
for the process; access to information 
rights; mechanisms to find solutions 
in the case of conflicts between gov-
ernments and stakeholders, a clear 
outline of the process phases and so 
forth – in other words: the document 
describes a sort of a legal framework for 
the revision process.  
Enable the inclusion of stake-
holders. The capacity and/or capacity 
building needs of all relevant stake-
holders are discussed. Specific bottle-
necks for the process are identified 
(e.g. information on time; communi- 
 
cation capacities of so far especially 
excluded groups), solutions to work 
on these developed. Training pro-
grams to strengthen skills of stake-
holders (e.g. analytical skills, commu-
nication skills) are initiated. Specific 
programs to include and empower 
poor people are developed; this 
should include the dissemination of 
information through channels acces-
sible for the poor (e.g. radio in local 
languages), participatory poverty 
assessments, local consultation struc-
tures and others. Specific programs 
address the capacity needs of often 
underrepresented parts of the popula-
tion (e.g. women). 
Create public space for debate. The 
process is transparent from the very 
beginning. A communication strategy 
(two-way-communication!) is devel-
oped. Media get frequent information 
as well as specific support (e.g.: spe-
cific training workshops for journal-
ists, facilitated by an independent 
institution). A specific website for the 
revision process is launched and in-
cludes all relevant documents and up-
to-date information on how the pro-
cess unfolds. In an ideal scenario, the 
website is jointly run by the govern-
mental PRS unit and societal stake-
holders (e.g. a leading CSO network). 
Public events are organized on a fre-
quent basis not only at national, but 
also at regional levels (see the Tanza-
nian Poverty Policy Week). 
 
  
Stakeholder Participation in PRS Processes:  
Recommendations for Practitioners 
Birte Rodenberg 
1.  Introduction 
The objective of the following 
part of the project, supported by the 
German Institute for Development 
and Peace (INEF), is to identify crucial 
entry points that can contribute to an 
enhanced politically embedded institu-
tionalization process of PRS participa-
tion, whereas it is not intended to 
replace the chapter on participation in 
the World Bank’s (WB) Source Book 
(2002a), which still remains the most 
comprehensive collection of technical 
instruments on the issue. 
Based on the project’s back-
ground papers, the recommendations 
for practitioners are structured 
around the PRS policy cycle (see 2.1 to 
2.3). Selected cross-cutting issues are 
to be discussed in 2.4. Being advisory 
rather than prescriptive, the major 
parts of the recommendations address 
different actors simultaneously, 
whereas the sub-chapter 2.5 will give 
an overview of selected stakeholder 
specific recommendations.  
Participatory PRS processes, 
aiming at full country ownership of 
their national poverty reduction poli-
cies, generally need country-led and 
tailor-made solutions to their prob-
lems. By definition and by its main 
principles, the PRS approach is not 
only a technical approach, but in-
volves inherently political questions 
of participatory governance, of socie-
tal democratization and social 
changes and also of the implementa-
tion of human rights. Taking these 
dimensions into consideration, foster-
ing participation processes in PRSPs 
seem to be a rather historical chal-
lenge (see Booth 2005). Thus, besides 
technical and instrumental improve-
ments a more politically and socially 
embedded procedure is needed.  
National ownership and mean-
ingful participation need to be 
strengthened in order to make pov-
erty reduction sustainable. In turn, 
both are crucial elements underlying 
the enhancement of development 
effectiveness and (social) accountabil-
ity (IMF/World Bank 2005; Malena et 
al. 2004), whereas good governance 
and empowerment, particularly of 
poor people, are critical factors to the 
PRS process, aiming at a participatory 
development. However, it becomes 
clear that already the prerequisites to 
the ambitious aims are quite complex 
and difficult to implement. Consider-
ing the wide range of existing gov-
ernance and political structures in the 
PRS countries, there are no simple 
one-off leverages to recommend. 
Thus, in order to avoid “pitching for 
the ideal” and according to good 
practice experiences (see Entwistle et 
al. 2005), the following recommenda-
tions try to contribute to the “missing 
middle” of the process: the need to 
specify how well-intentioned policies 
will deliver promised outcomes and 
impacts by implementing social de-
velopment tools.  
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2.  Recommendations 
Who are the stakeholders? Key 
stakeholder groups may vary by 
country and by PRS cycle stage, but 
should include the poor and the non-
poor:  
At the national level: 
I. Relevant government line 
ministries, departments and 
agencies, 
II. Members of parliaments (or 
legislative assembly), and 
III. NGOs and CSOs (both advo-
cacy and service-oriented 
groups) 
IV. Private sector actors, and 
V. Donors/development part-
ners.  
At the local level: 
I. Local government and tradi-
tional authorities, 
II. Local NGOs and CBOs (both 
advocacy and service-
oriented groups), 
III. CBOs and membership or-
ganizations representing PRS 
target populations (including 
women, youth). 
Despite the intention to include 
a wide range of stakeholders in the 
participation process, the analyses 
have shown that important actors – 
particularly the poor and parliaments 
– remain excluded and cannot con-
tribute to it as they potentially could. 
Thus, an open participatory planning 
and organizing process is important 
to include the poor and vulnerable 
groups.  
A country-specific stakeholder 
analysis is important to a comprehen-
sive, harmonized and clearly struc-
tured participatory PRS process in 
general and will be particularly help-
ful for later PRS cycle stages (see 2.2 
and 2.3). It is a systematic methodol-
ogy that uses qualitative data to de-
termine the interests and influence of 
different groups in relation to a policy 
reform or/and poverty impact analy-
sis (see World Bank 2003: 49). It can be 
structured as an overview, classifying 
the specific tasks and responsibilities 
to be assumed by each stakeholder 
group and should include a descrip-
tion of their roles and responsibilities, 
differentiating between four different 
features of participation:  
I. Gathering/providing informa-
tion 
II. Controlling the process, con-
tents and results of a monitor-
ing activity 
III. Identifying shortcomings and 
reformulating policies, and 
IV. Implementing amendatory 
actions (Lucas et al. 2004: 17; 
Eberlei/Siebold 2006: 6f.).  
Closely related to the stake-
holder analysis is the issue of the 
stakeholders’ representativeness or 
“legitimacy”, which has been recog-
nized in principle by all countries 
involved in the PRS process. Never-
theless, the question of the legitimacy 
of non-state actors often comes up in 
cases of conflicts between govern-
ments and non-state actors, or when 
the latter claim a right to participation 
concerning sensitive political issues. 
As has been emphasized widely in 
analyses on the institutionalized par-
ticipation (Eberlei 2002; 2002a), more 
attention needs to be paid particularly 
to the criterion of the representativity 
of civil society actors. In order to en-
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hance the processes’ legitimacy 
through broad-based and inclusive 
participation and in order to avoid 
arbitrary invitation modes, criteria, 
such as rural/urban parity, gender 
parity, independency and inclusive-
ness should be considered by PRS 
planning and policy departments. But 
important factors that can raise their 
legitimacy and should also be consid-
ered, come from “within” CSOs:  
I. Subject competence, gained 
through years of active devel-
opment work (e.g. NGOs op-
erating in socio-political fields 
and service-delivery, such as 
health and education); 
II. Proof of a broad membership 
basis (e.g. churches); 
III. Networking of civil society 
organizations (Eberlei/Siebold 
2006: 7). 
Having learned their lessons 
from the first PRS policy cycle, the 
Tanzanian government built on this 
framework and set up consultation 
guidelines for the second-round con-
sultations, upfront to the revision 
process (Eberlei 2007 in this volume). 
Since this initiative can also serve as a 
guideline for other countries and for 
earlier stages of the process, it is re-
produced again below.  
 
Box 1:  A Good Practice Example from Tanzania – Consultation Guidelines 
The PRS review consultation will seek to employ some principles of a 
human rights approach to poverty reduction strategies. The PRS review consul-
tation aims at institutionalising the participation process.  The four standard 
principles namely rights, structures, legitimacy and capacity will be adhered to. 
Rights: The current PRS review strives to ensure that the consultation 
process by all the stakeholders are characterised by freedom of opinion, infor-
mation, media, association and campaigning. The stakeholders participate fully 
in the entire PRS cycle and the role of each stakeholder is clearly stipulated. 
Structures: Leading stakeholders ensure views are collected from the 
grass root level to the national level. The Government will ensure openness 
prevails throughout the process in terms of information as regards to PRS cycle. 
The implementation of PRS will be decentralized and each individual stake-
holder will have the role to contribute. 
Legitimacy: Parliament will fully be involved in the PRS process and will 
have the role to approve the PRSP.  The civil society organisations and other 
stakeholders have to organise and ensure that they are included in the process. 
Capacity: The PRS review process will entail capacity building for stake-
holders for them to effectively contribute in the PRS cycle. 
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania 2004: 4f. 
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2.1  Implementation processes 
Box 2:  Implementation – Governments’ Engagement and Donors’ Support 
(Overview) 
Macro-economic policymaking 
-  Facilitating open multi-stakeholder fora for substantive dialogues on 
macroeconomic framework + policy options  
-  Supporting capacity building (advocacy + lobbying) for CSO 
The budget cycle 
-  Disclosure of information to public + parliament  
-  Considering results of consultations and analysis 
PSIA 
-  Continuing efforts for carrying out PSIAs in a transparent and participa-
tory way.  
 
The implementation process 
can be understood in two ways: on 
the one hand, it is the stage of the 
whole PRS process that is responsible 
for implementing the agreed invest-
ment strategy and policy reforms. On 
the other hand, it is the perpetuation 
of the PRS cycle itself, including 
monitoring and revision. The follow-
ing part draws mainly on implemen-
tation as part of the whole PRS cycle. 
As has been pinpointed in the back-
ground papers (see Bliss 2006 and 
Führmann 2006), the degree to which 
civil society actors have been actively 
involved during the implementation 
phase varies significantly. Referring 
to 15 country studies, a sharp de-
crease in participation has been rec-
ognized after the formulation phase, 
because the implementation of the 
strategy was left almost exclusively to 
the government bodies – partly also 
due to civil society that kept at a dis-
tance.  
Revisions of one very impor-
tant element of the PRS-
implementation have pointed out that 
the stakeholder participation is very 
weak especially in economic planning 
and the macro-economic policymak-
ing, where hardly any actors other 
than the IFIs and selected governmen-
tal representatives are involved. But 
participation of non-economic gov-
ernmental and civil society actors is 
weak not only due to a lack of politi-
cal will by governments. Rather, it is 
limited due to the nature of sophisti-
cated macroeconomic analyses that 
are highly technical. However, well-
documented good-practice experi-
ences on a district and national level 
(see World Bank 2002a: 259 ff and for 
the Tanzanian Gender Budget Initia-
tive see Rusimbi 2003), have shown 
that the PRS process can also open up 
new opportunities for wider and – to 
a certain extent also – meaningful 
participation in macroeconomic pol-
icy making. But these chances might 
remain limited only to certain stake-
holder groups, belonging to the coun-
try’s educational elite. Their main 
entry points referred to here, which 
can be distilled from the background 
studies, are budget expenditure re-
views and poverty impact analysis 
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(PSIA). Generally spoken, participa-
tion in the macro-economic policy-
making can be enhanced through 
some general principles adhered to in 
the PRS process: 
I. Offering an open, substantive 
dialogue in a multi-
stakeholder forum, where 
donors, governmental repre-
sentatives, parliamentarians 
and non-governmental stake-
holders can discuss the 
macro-economic policy of a 
country’s PRSP, and where al-
ternative paths to the IFIs’ 
targets on monetary and fiscal 
policies might also be devel-
oped. A more established and 
permanent working form 
could be its institutionaliza-
tion as a consultative working 
group at the national level 
(Trócaire 2004: 7). 
II. Building capacity of non-
economists (also among gov-
ernmental actors) to develop 
their understanding of the ba-
sics of macroeconomic poli-
cymaking procedures, tools 
and concepts and to train 
their – advocacy - skills ap-
propriate to their demands 
(e.g. CSO representatives who 
want to debate tax policy in 
principle). On a meso or local 
level, economic literacy 
courses should be offered and 
intensified to broaden the ba-
sic understanding of eco-
nomic issues.  
III. Offering sufficient time dur-
ing the implementation stage 
to adapt the time frame at 
least to basic capacity build-
ing and consultancy require-
ments of the involved stake-
holders.  
An effective and transparent 
budget planning and budget expendi-
ture management (PEM) needs en-
hanced civil society initiatives. Com-
munal or national budget formulation 
and expenditure tracking can be fos-
tered by  
I. A systematic dissemination of 
information to the public and 
parliament in an accessible 
and timely manner. Economic 
literacy on the micro level and 
capacity training in budget 
analysis on a higher level, 
planning and monitoring 
should be supported by do-
nors and governments. 
II. Considering the results of 
consultations of public and 
stakeholders on budget 
analysis and priorities, in-
cluding gender budget analy-
sis and monitoring reports of 
NGOs (the latter should be at-
tached to governmental notes 
and reports) as well as sup-
porting parliamentary budget 
monitoring procedures. 
III. A better inclusion of inde-
pendent national policy re-
search institutes to monitor 
national budget expenditures 
and linking up with civil soci-
ety think tanks: even if advo-
cacy groups and parliamen-
tarians or other stakeholders 
have been built up macroeco-
nomic capacities, they may 
not be able to do economic 
analyses. In order to enhance 
the credibility of civil society 
representatives economic re-
search institutes (think tanks) 
can play a critical role by pro-
viding the necessary expertise 
in the critical assessment of 
policies (see Box 3).  
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Box 3:  Good practice in Kenya – Linking up Research and Advocacy 
A successful example is the co-operation between the African women’s 
network FEMNET and the economic research institute KIPPRA in Nairobi. 
FEMNET asked two economic researchers of KIPPRA to analyse the macroeco-
nomic framework of the Kenyan PRSP from a gender perspective and used 
these findings to promote a public dialogue on gender and macroeconomics to 
create awareness on the need to mainstream equality in the PRS process.  
Source: Wandia 2003 and DAC Network on Gender Equality 2004. 
Sector policy reforms: As has 
been pointed out in the background 
analysis to this project, the link be-
tween policy reforms (either sectoral 
or administrative) and the PRS proc-
ess in general and participation in 
particular is very weak (Führmann 
2006). However, very few positive 
examples of participation of civil soci-
ety and intra-governmental participa-
tion in sectoral reforms can be ascer-
tained, especially in the social sector 
(see Box 4 below). In order to link 
sectoral reforms more closely to the 
PRS process and to include sectoral 
ministries better, three aspects are 
important: 
I. Building capacity for governmen-
tal actors from parliament and 
sectoral ministries firstly, on mac-
roeconomic policymaking (see 
above) to support their ability to 
intervene substantively in their 
particular areas of a PRS process; 
and secondly, to facilitate and 
conduct effective participatory re-
form processes as required in a 
PRSP.  
II. To improve the access to informa-
tion and capacity building for 
non-governmental stakeholders, 
particularly NGO-representatives, 
firstly, to understand complex 
policy processes and the planned 
reforms, and secondly, to be ca-
pable of developing feasible al-
ternatives. 
III. Identify more effective entry 
points for NGOs and their specific 
capacities, e.g. in social service 
delivery. In Ethiopia, for example, 
NGOs play a key role implement-
ing the national health strategy, 
but they have limited participa-
tion in health policy formulation 
and national program evalua-
tions. Recently indicated positive 
trends towards improvement 
should be followed on in the PRS 
monitoring process (Führmann 
2006: 23). 
 
Box 4:  Intra- and Non-governmental Participation in Sectoral Reforms 
Participation of sector ministries in Senegal: For the purpose of implemen-
ting the PRS, the objectives and policies have been turned into Sector Operation 
Programs, which are the principal tools for the implementation of the PRS. 
These documents incorporate the objectives and lines of action in the matrix of 
measures for activities and projects, together with budgets and timetables. The 
elaboration and execution of sector action strategies lie mainly with the sector 
ministries and partly with regional governments. Twenty-four ministries in 
charge of the sectors are directly or indirectly involved in PRS implementation.  
Source: Führmann 2006: 18f.       (to be continued) 
(continued) 
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Participation of non-state actors in the education sector: In several instances 
the education component of the PRS has been significantly determined by the 
National Education Strategy (e.g. Cambodia, Nicaragua, Tanzania) prepared on 
the basis of a sector diagnosis, more often than not with the participation of 
donor representatives. Other stakeholders – the CSOs, representatives of educa-
tion NGOs, and more generally the education stakeholders (teacher unions, 
academics, associations of teachers and students) – did affect, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the formulation of the education component of the PRS by contributing 
national, regional and thematic consultations. This is the case, for example, in 
Nicaragua, where teachers, parents and students have been involved; in Alba-
nia, where half of the members of the education sector working group were 
teachers, professors and education NGOs. Examples illustrate the contribution 
of the education stakeholders in the formulation of the PRSP: In Honduras, 
consultations have led to the compilation of a list of priorities, and in Vietnam, 
free access to primary education for the poor has been put on the agenda 
(Chaillods/Hallak 2004: 42f.). 
 
Poverty Social Impact Analyses 
(PSIA): As a key instrument for as-
sessing negative and distributional 
impacts on the poorest, which may 
arise particularly within the macro-
economic PRS framework, PSIA has 
received a lot of attention recently 
(see the World Bank’s User Guide on 
PSIA 2003 and for critical reflections: 
McDonald 2006). It can play a central 
role in the macroeconomic policy 
process, provided that it is embedded 
into a transparent process:  
I. Ex-ante: How are the topics for 
the World Bank’s PSIAs chosen 
and by whom? 
II. Ex-post: Are the results under-
standable and have summaries 
been disseminated in the stake-
holder community? Have they 
been discussed openly with re-
gard to the most important 
poverty-related board papers 
and PRS drafts? Have summa-
ries of stakeholders´ positions 
been attached (Trócaire 2004: 7 
and McDonald 2006)? 
III. With special regard to the inte-
gral part of social analysis 
within the PSIA approach, and 
emphasizing the need to bring 
in the views of the poor while 
carefully dealing with the inevi-
table conflicts between different 
interest groups in a transparent 
policy dialogue, valuable advice 
has been provided by 
GTZ/DFID (2006; see Box 5) for 
organizing community-based 
meetings that encourage further 
participation and manage con-
flicts on the local level. For fur-
ther examples, practitioners 
should refer to a report on a lo-
cal government taxation reform 
and a PSIA process, carried out 
in 2005 in Tanzania which re-
flects the challenging multi-
stakeholder dialogue on differ-
ent understandings and percep-
tions about the objectives and 
means of fiscal decentralization 
policy in Tanzanian districts 
(World Bank 2006).  
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Box 5:  Fostering multi-stakeholder dialogues on a micro level and 
opening space for the poor  
How to organize and manage meetings for participatory social impact as-
sessments (PSIA): 
• Preplanning: careful consideration of venue and distances, timing, organiza-
tion and selection of participants, so as not to discourage particularly vul-
nerable groups from coming (assistance with transport, provision of food). 
• Composition of the meeting: need for separate consultations for women and 
men and representatives from different clans/castes/classes? Otherwise: 
How to make use of the opportunity for bringing together these so-
cially/culturally different groups in a neutral environment? 
• Size and composition of groups, clarifying their positions: Homogenous or 
mixed? 
• Capacities of meeting facilitators: Local language skills, mediating conflicts, 
etc. Also: The need to manage various levels of participation, encourage 
quieter participants. 
• Opening space for follow-up meetings, and disseminating information in 
further political stages.  
Source: Peter Poulsen, in: GTZ/DFID 2006: 9f. 
 
2.2  Monitoring Processes 
Box 6:  Overview: Monitoring: key area – not only for “watchdogs” 
Strengthening parliament and the legal basis 
Supporting an independent “monitoring watch” 
-  Distributing shadow reports written by CS umbrella groups 
Featuring the political nature of technical instruments 
-  Indicators on sensitive political issues + societal change 
-  Strengthening accountability through public presentation of Annual Pro-
gress Reports 
-  Policy research/ analyses: Be aware of policy evaporation  
 
Emphasizing the enormous po-
tential of a politically driven learning 
process inherent to the PRS principles, 
one main conceptual weakness of the 
PRS monitoring and evaluation phase 
has been pinpointed by recent analy-
ses: The concentration on technical 
aspects and instruments, while the 
wide-ranging political implications of 
participatory monitoring have been 
neglected (Eberlei/Siebold, 2006: 5; 
Trócaire 2004: 3). Moreover, capacity 
constraints have been identified again 
as being one of the greatest impedi-
ments to meaningful participatory 
monitoring (Eberlei/Siebold, 2006: 22). 
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Since numerous methods, techniques 
and tools for participatory poverty 
monitoring have been developed by 
donor agencies and independent ex-
perts from the PRS countries, the fol-
lowing recommendations focus pri-
marily on entry points for channeling 
a better feedback of monitoring find-
ings into the national policy dialogue 
(The World Bank’s User Guide on 
PSIA 2003: 47ff provides an excellent 
overview over economic and social 
tools for poverty and social impact 
analysis). 
Ideally, a participatory moni-
toring system will be developed on a 
legal basis and permits all relevant 
governmental and non-state actors to 
join in the monitoring process. The 
often quoted Bolivian law on social 
mechanisms that improved the legal 
framework for monitoring activities 
of non-governmental stakeholders 
beyond constitutionally guaranteed 
principles and enhanced competen-
cies primarily at community level is a 
good example for steps taken by gov-
ernments towards the institutionaliza-
tion of participation (see Ko-
mives/Aguilar 2005: 12 and Eber-
lei/Siebold 2006: 18).  
In turn, a legal framework does 
not necessarily mean that parliament 
will also be brought into the process 
as an active PRS stakeholder, al-
though this should be intended. A 
comparative study on country owner-
ship processes in various PRS coun-
tries has shown that the role and the 
impact of national institutions re-
mained limited in Bolivia, since nei-
ther a parliamentary committee had 
been established to monitor the Boliv-
ian PRSP nor was the PRSP submitted 
to Congress for approval or discus-
sion (Entwistle et al. 2005, Vol. I: 33).  
However, the instrument of the 
“LEADS assessments”, developed by 
the WB’s Operations Policy and 
Country Services, leading to sophisti-
cated assessment of the direction in 
which each country is moving, shall 
be recommended here as a useful 
monitoring instrument for complex 
policy reform processes:  
The LEADS assessment (ibid: 
33ff): 
L  Little or no action: Due to a 
wide variety of circum-
stances, including political 
developments, capacity limi-
tations, unforeseen events, ac-
tion has remained at a virtual 
standstill.  
E Elements exist/being consid-
ered: There is some basis for 
making progress, either 
through what already exists, 
or definite plans.  
A  Action being taken: Progress 
is being made, although not 
yet enough, and the basis ex-
ists for even more substantive 
progress.  
D Largely developed: Signifi-
cant action taken already, al-
though some further action is 
needed.  
S Substantially in place: The ac-
tivity is virtually accom-
plished.  
A legal framework for the 
monitoring procedure can also 
strengthen a broad public debate. A 
“negotiation table” that brings to-
gether governmental and non-state 
actors and gives room to develop new 
multiple stakeholder frameworks for 
a harmonized coordination of the 
country’s implementation and moni-
toring, has been implemented in Ar-
menia and seems to be a promising 
mechanism (Azizyan/Mallmann 2005; 
Eberlei/Siebold, 2006: 13).  
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Meaningful participation can be 
enhanced by an independent monitor-
ing structure (a “monitoring watch”) 
by civil society and non-state actors, 
allowing critical analysis of data and 
processes (see below PSIA and APR). 
Shadow reports by national and in-
ternational NGOs, transmitting also 
non-conforming points of view on 
government-led and donor-led activi-
ties can strengthen substantive politi-
cal dialogues.  
In order to shape participatory 
monitoring procedures in a more 
strategically way, the political charac-
ter of technical instruments should be 
given greater emphasis: 
Indicators should be specified 
in terms of input, output, outcome 
and impact and need to be formulated 
precisely in a SMART way (specific, 
measurable, achievable, relevant, and 
time-bound). Another concern that 
should be addressed more effectively 
in future is the “translation” of socio-
political aspects of poverty reduction 
processes into SMART indicators. 
Good governance and anti-corruption 
aspects as well as empowerment and 
human rights-related issues need to 
be operationalized, despite the fact 
that complex and iterative societal 
changes cannot always be measured 
in a standardized manner.  
Therefore, the ongoing debate 
should be broadened as a prerequisite 
to institutionalize monitoring proc-
esses of socio-political reforms. The 
link between the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) and national 
PRSPs should also be seen in this 
context and related to debates con-
cerning appropriated indicators 
(Eberlei/Siebold, 2006: 9; see Table 1 
on empowerment indicators in 
MDGs). Present efforts made by the 
World Bank to develop key indicators 
on overall principles of aid and donor 
harmonization strategies (as laid 
down in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness 2005), are promising 
steps towards comprehensive moni-
toring approaches.  
 
Table 1:  Seven strategic priorities and indicators for action on Millennium 
Development Goal 3  
Strategic priority Empowerment indicators for progress report 
1.  Strengthen opportunities for 
post-primary education for 
girls while meeting commit-
ments to universal primary 
education 
• The ratio of female to male gross enrollment rates 
in primary, secondary, and tertiary education 
• The ratio of female to male completion rates in 
primary, secondary, and tertiary education 
2.  Guarantee sexual and repro-
ductive health and rights  
• Proportion of contraceptive demand satisfied 
• Adolescent fertility rate 
3.  Invest in infrastructure to re-
duce women’s and girls’ time 
burdens 
• Hours per day (or year) women and men spend 
fetching water and collecting fuel 
4.  Guarantee women’s and girls’ 
property and inheritance 
rights 
• Land ownership by male, female, or jointly held 
• Housing title, disaggregated by male, female, or 
jointly held 
(to be continued) 
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(continued) 
5.  Eliminate gender inequality in 
employment by decreasing 
women’s reliance on informal 
employment, closing gender 
gaps in earnings, and reducing 
occupational segregation 
 
• Gender gaps in earnings in wage and self-
employment 
• Share of women in employment, both wage and 
self-employment, by type 
6.  Increase women’s share of 
seats in national parliaments 
and local government bodies 
• Percentage of seats held by women in national 
parliament 
• Percentage of seats held by women in local gov-
ernment bodies 
7.  Combat violence against 
women 
• Prevalence of domestic violence 
Source:  Recommended by the UN Task Force on Education and Gender 
Equality 2005: 18 ff 
The need for localized goals, 
targets and indicators that also reflect 
socio-political aspects has been dis-
cussed in depth within the gender 
community, with regard to the par-
ticularly problematical missing di-
mension of women’s human rights in 
the MDGs. From a feminist point of 
view, gender experts have pointed 
out that the notion of women’s em-
powerment in the MDGs is reduction-
ist. Furthermore, the conflation of 
gender issues and poverty reduction 
ignores power imbalances and struc-
tural issues, such as violence and re-
productive rights – a frequent criti-
cism in PRSPs, too (see Rodenberg 
2004a, Whitehead 2003). Reflecting 
these missing links, the UN Task 
Force on Education and Gender 
Equality (2005) has developed strate-
gic priorities and coherent social indi-
cators for action on MDG3 (“Promote 
gender equality and empower 
women”), which provide comprehen-
sive and politically sensitive tools for 
measuring women’s participation 
(and to a certain extent rights) in po-
litical and socio-economic domains.  
The Annual Progress Report 
(APR) is another important instru-
ment that needs to be given more 
attention. It is meant to serve political 
monitoring purposes, namely as ac-
countable reporting on governmental 
activities on poverty reduction. Nev-
ertheless, the vast majority of coun-
tries do not make use of the APR in 
the enabling sense of a learning in-
strument. Instead of perceiving the 
APR as “another onerous donor re-
quirement” (Trócaire 2004: 3), it 
should be used to share the efforts in 
compiling and analyzing data with 
civil society actors and parliament.  
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Box 8:  Recommendation: The Annual Progress Report (APR) as a Learning 
Instrument 
• Initiating an open-minded, public debate on the effectiveness of national 
poverty reduction measures by an early presentation of the APR to the gen-
eral public. 
• Using different forms of communication and media channels.  
• Disseminating civil society monitoring reports (‘shadow reports’) on the 
same subject as an annex to the Joint Staff Assessments of the APRs to foster 
the debate on policy options.  
 
Policy research and negotiation 
processes should be transparent and 
open to all stakeholder groups from 
the initial cycle stage. Poverty and 
social analysis and impact assess-
ments should be designed and carried 
out in a participatory way. Special 
attention should be given to the 
evaluation of data and its incorpora-
tion into the strategy. All instrumental 
elements, which are part of the ana-
lytical and decision-making processes 
(PPA results, PSIA with concept notes 
and ToRs; presentation, draft reports 
etc.) should be circulated early and 
widely. Diverging positions and al-
ternative views (shadow reports, 
gender analysis, differing statements 
by line ministries etc.) should be in-
cluded in the annex to the respective 
document. In order to a) ensure up-
scaling of gathered data and to facili-
tate monitoring of PRS impacts in 
future, and b) to avoid loss of data in 
conceptual frameworks and strategies 
(policy evaporation), particularly 
PPAs should not be seen as a one-off 
event but be institutionalized as an 
integral part of the monitoring pro-
cess in all countries, preparing a sec-
ond-generation PRSP (Trócaire 2004: 
6). Appointing representatives, who 
would be responsible for mediating 
and negotiating the policy research 
findings throughout all PRS policy 
stages can support these efforts.  
2.3  Revision Processes 
Out of 48 countries that have 
completed the PRS cycle, only a few 
countries have finalized their PRS 
review processes so far. Based on that 
early experience and by drawing 
mainly on good practices in Uganda 
and Tanzania, the following recom-
mendations can be distilled (cf. Eber-
lei 2007): 
I. Strengthening CSO ownership: 
funds offered by the govern-
ment can be used for parallel 
consultative processes of CSOs 
in order to revise and evaluate 
former PRS results, and also to 
prepare and prioritize future 
policy agendas.  
II. Open and broad-based invita-
tion modes: support to non-
governmental “lead stake-
holders” in organizing inde-
pendent and decentralized con-
sultative fora for broad and 
transparent opinion-forming 
processes. 
III. Multiple-method approach to 
information dissemination: The 
use of a wide variety of com-
munication instruments (news-
papers, flyers with simple ques-
tionnaires, (local) radio, TV, art 
and drama, etc.) helps to create 
public awareness. Internet post-
ing is not sufficient. Further-
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more, translations into the main 
local and also plain languages 
are recommended. 
IV. Self-monitoring as a learning 
process: Upfront analysis of 
missing links and shortcomings 
in former process cycles and 
their open discussion helps to 
avoid repeating mistakes (i.e. 
the insufficient inclusion of 
gender issues) or at least helps 
to identify weaknesses (i.e. lack 
of priorities). 
V. Reducing time pressure: a 
broad-based participatory revi-
sion process needs realistic time 
planning, resulting in an ample 
timeframe. The beginning of the 
revision process should be an-
nounced before it starts.  
 
The successful institutionaliza-
tion of participation in the revision 
processes of Tanzania and Uganda 
has been pushed forward by  
I. Developing a legal framework 
for the review process and em-
ploying a rights-based ap-
proach (see also box 1 on the 
Tanzanian Consultation Guide-
lines) 
II. Strengthening the legitimacy of 
the review process by involving 
parliaments, supporting civil 
society networks and systemati-
cally involving the voices of the 
poor. 
III. Building capacity of all stake-
holders by making specific ef-
forts to strengthen and to fund 
independent, non-governmen-
tal, gender and community-
based organizations and 
IV. Establishing permanent dia-
logue fora and mechanisms for 
an ongoing substantive poverty 
analysis and joint policy agenda 
setting. 
 
Box 9:  Revision Processes step-by-step – A short guide to good practices  
(i)  Review experience with the participatory process during formulation, 
implementation and monitoring of the first PRS, and based on this  
(ii)  Enter into an explicit, multi-stakeholder process of defining "terms of 
engagement" for the revision process/second cycle PRSP, including iden-
tifying the structures, rights, legitimacy and capacity needs of actors in-
volved; 
(iii)  Joint and public analysis of implementation experience and results, 
changes in the overall development context of the country that would re-
quire re-prioritization; 
(iv)  In view of the implementation experience, include the voices and prefer-
ences of the various societal groups, including poor women and men and 
their representatives, into re-prioritization of the new strategy; 
(v)  Include a plan for placing future implementation and monitoring on a 
more participatory basis and more fully involving the multitude of stake-
holders. 
(compiled by R. Forster/World Bank; April 2006; personal communication)  
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2.4  Cross-cutting issues: Empowerment and Inclusion 
Box 10:  Time, Space, Voice and Choice – Requirements for meaningful 
participation and empowerment of the poor 
• Adjusting the time-frame, reducing time pressure 
• Providing public spaces for substantive policy dialogues on national 
agenda setting 
• Guaranteeing the right to information (top-down) 
• Including strategic interests of the poor (bottom-up) 
• Overcoming capacity constraints of all stakeholders and supporting up-
scaling of policy capacities of disempowered 
 
Despite all good intentions and 
the conceptual and practical progress 
made during the past six years of PRS 
implementation, some crucial chal-
lenges remain important throughout 
all policy cycles. In broad terms, these 
unresolved problems are mutually 
intertwined with the development 
agenda and the core PRS principles, 
namely aiming at a comprehensive 
participatory poverty reduction ap-
proach and referring to a framework: 
increased development and aid effec-
tiveness, donor alignment, fostering 
country ownership and (social) ac-
countability (see Malena/Forster/ 
Singh 2004).  
However, there are important 
cross-cutting issues underlying the 
crucial framework-related constraints 
and bottlenecks that need to be paid 
more attention to: With regard to the 
background papers, particularly the 
poor and vulnerable sub-groups 
(women, rural and suburban popula-
tion, marginalized youth groups, the 
elderly and the physically disabled) 
have remained marginalized in most 
process stages. Thus, the cross-cutting 
issues empowerment and inclusion of 
the poor with a gender perspective 
will be tackled here.  
Empowerment can be under-
stood as a process of gaining control 
over the self as well as over the re-
sources which determine power; it is 
– as the African sociologist Sarah 
Longwe (1991) has put it – a strategy 
of collective action by the disempow-
ered people. However, to include 
them better especially in diagnostics 
phases, the agenda setting (prioritiza-
tion) and monitoring mechanisms, an 
enabling environment and support by 
donors, governments and CSO repre-
sentatives is needed. Thus, important 
steps towards their inclusion in order 
to overcome their state of powerless-
ness could be the following: 
International donors and gov-
ernments could give support to em-
powerment processes by 
I. Offering additional financial 
means. Donors should be ready 
to finance e.g. local consulta-
tions in PRS review processes 
(see the positive example of 
Tanzania) or impact monitoring 
exercises including the poor 
(like UPPAP in Uganda, see 
Eberlei/Siebold, 2006 and Eber-
lei 2007).  
II. Making stronger references to 
empowerment issues in the 
Joint Staff Advisory Notes on 
PRS, since none of the JSAs 
published in 2005 includes a 
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single remark on empowerment 
issues. 
III. Making sure that participatory 
processes are inclusive, repre-
sentative and decentralized, 
that is, stakeholder analyses 
should reflect the level of par-
ticipation of “the poor”: How 
many are represented? By 
whom? Rural and/or urban 
poor? Are the interests of vul-
nerable sub-groups like the 
physically disabled, the elderly, 
marginalized youth, widows, 
HIV-Aids orphans and (street-) 
children represented? Are 
women represented equally in 
all groups? 
IV. Adjusting the time frame and 
reducing time pressure.  
V. Offering space for the consid-
eration of diverse interests, 
needs and instruments (see Box 
5). Attention should be paid to 
predictable problems and con-
flicts. Handing over guidance 
(partly or entirely) of the proc-
ess to facilitators or mediators – 
also PRS-neutral, but public 
person of the country – can help 
to find constructive, pro-poor-
oriented solutions. 
VI. Institutionalizing the right to in-
formation and articulation: The 
planning and implementation 
process as well as the dissemi-
nation of the corresponding re-
sults should be presented in a 
way that everybody can under-
stand. Process- and research-
related documents should be 
written in the national and the 
main local language(s) or be 
translated. A wide range of dif-
ferent forms and methods of 
communication, such as radio 
phone-ins, simple question-
naires, art and drama, public 
meetings, group discussions, 
etc. should be considered so as 
to inform and enable disadvan-
taged stakeholders. 
 
Non-state stakeholders, espe-
cially umbrella NGOs can give sup-
port by  
I. Ensuring flow of and access to 
information by informing sys-
tematically about ongoing po-
litical processes (top-down 
feedback).  
II. Feeding back bottom-up trans-
fer of local consultation results 
by considering and supporting 
CBOs (see Box 11) and  
III. Assisting in the development of 
country-specific empowerment 
indicators on poverty reduction, 
intermediating the interests of 
the poor.  
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Box 11:  Strengthening bottom-up alliances by grassroot networking 
There are not many intermediating NGOs like the international networks 
GROOTS. It sees its role as working exclusively with extremely poor segments 
of the population, who generally only benefit from short-term charity measures. 
GROOTS, however, is seeking to strengthen their empowerment process by 
supporting political literacy and civic education. In connection with the Kenyan 
PRSP, the national platform of the organization was involved in poverty analy-
ses and consultations at the district level and, together with their target groups 
in the poor districts of Nairobi, they fought for discussion of a grassroots 
agenda in the municipal council. 
Source: Rodenberg 2004a: 48f. 
 
Efforts are needed to overcome 
capacity constraints of all stake-
holders at different intervention lev-
els:  
I. Macro level: As with the PRS 
processes in general and macro-
economic policy-making or 
budget expenditure tracking in 
particular, the multiple efforts 
by donors to inform, to train, to 
enable and to empower the dif-
ferent stakeholders need to be 
a) intensified and b) harmo-
nized, if meaningful contribu-
tions are wanted. At the macro 
level, further efforts are re-
quired to fill the “knowledge 
gap” between IFIs, bilateral do-
nors and governments on the 
one hand and CSOs (NGOs) on 
the other. 
II. Meso level: The role and capa-
bility of networks in assessing 
the needs of their member or-
ganizations and in mobilizing 
support for training could be 
better supported by donors in 
terms of financial, logistic and 
political aspects. Empowerment 
indicators should be derived 
mainly from stakeholders work-
ing in an intermediating do-
main that legitimizes them to 
bring in the voices of the poor.  
III. Micro level: Practical monitor-
ing and evaluation tools (e.g. 
Citizen Report and Community 
Score Card) that include and 
enable the poor have proved to 
have essential capacity building 
impacts. Again, particularly 
PPAs and – if introduced trans-
parently from the beginning of 
the process – also PSIAs can 
contribute to stakeholders’ ca-
pacity building as important en-
try points of these participatory 
diagnostics and monitoring 
techniques.  
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Box 12:  Representing the interests of the poor. Good practices from districts 
in Kenya 
The Full PRSP was prepared between November 2000 and May 2001, and 
was embedded in a markedly broad participation process. Consultations were 
carried out in Kenya's 70 districts, in some cases right down to the village level. 
Following the example of the surveys carried out by the World Bank (Narayan 
1999), information was gathered and systematized in a participatory process, 
serving as an example of the needs of those concerned. The actual consultation 
process, which was largely managed by NGOs and international development 
organizations, involved three to five workshops in the districts, each lasting one 
or more days and attended by some 150 to 200 people. The results were pre-
sented at District or Constituency Reporting Workshops and processed for the 
comprehensive district PRSP report. More than 60,000 people were involved in 
the overall process. Great importance was attached to gender parity and to ade-
quate participation of young people. The results of the district reports were also 
passed on to the sectoral and thematic PRSP working groups at the national 
level. Representatives of civil society participated in the preparation of the draft 
Full PRSP by the PRSP Secretariat in the spring of 2001, and were involved in 
discussions at public fora before it was submitted to the directorates of the IMF 
and the World Bank. One visible effect of this comprehensive participation 
process was seen in a shift of the priorities for poverty reduction. When these 
priority areas were brought together from a) the sectoral working groups, b) the 
thematic working groups, and c) the participatory poverty analyses in the dis-
tricts, the result was a ranking in favour of agriculture and rural development, 
human (resource) development, and infrastructure. The fields public safety, law 
and order, and information technology, on the other hand, were placed at the 
end of the list of priorities for poverty reduction. These latter focal points were, 
however, the ones favoured by the government.  
Source: Rodenberg 2004a: 50ff 
 
Gender mainstreaming and 
women’s empowerment: Criticism 
from a gender perspective, as voiced 
by national and international NGOs 
and gender advocates, has addressed 
structural shortcomings in the out-
come documents (an overall concept 
of women as a vulnerable group; 
fragmented gender analysis, but no 
transsectoral, long-term strategies that 
would aim at reducing gender-
specific social inequality and altering 
gender relations; gender-blind macro-
economic framework etc.; see World 
Bank 2001 and 2002b; Whitehead 
2003; Rodenberg 2004a: 36ff). As an 
inherent part of a predominant con-
ceptual misunderstanding of the gen-
der approach, they have also called 
into question the participation proce-
dure adopted during the elaboration 
process. It did not generally provide 
sufficient opportunities for women 
and women’s organizations to con-
tribute substantially to the process. 
Their criticism of the framework con-
ditions – namely the continued use of 
a Women-in-Development approach 
that delegates gender concerns to 
women – is directed especially to the 
failure to institutionalize the gender 
approach in the PRS process (see  
Rodenberg 2004). Thus, the “engen-
Birte Rodenberg 
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dering” of an institutionalized par-
ticipation in PRS process needs:  
I. A substantive policy dialogue on 
the gender issue, including do-
nors, governmental and non-
governmental actors that, firstly, 
links gender issues and the core 
principles of gender mainstream-
ing to the four parameters of insti-
tutionalized participation (rights, 
legitimacy, structures, capacity). 
Secondly, the national gender 
machinery should be linked up 
with “gender-neutral” (financial, 
economical, sectoral) state institu-
tions in order to support their po-
litical will. Nevertheless, this 
might be hampered by limited 
capacities of both, in bringing in a 
gender perspective to other than 
the social service sectors. If the 
gender mainstreaming approach 
is to progress beyond occasional 
good practices, more financial 
and human resources will be 
needed. Tailor-made gender 
training for governmental stake-
holders from line ministries and 
parliaments (as carried-out by 
GTZ for the Ethiopian Parliament; 
see Eberlei/Henn 2003) can raise 
gender awareness, upgrade pov-
erty-related gender know-how, 
and in that respect also foster 
country ownership.  
II. A broad, inclusive and parity so-
cietal participation at all levels: 
Since there is evidence that a criti-
cal mass of at least 30% women in 
democratic decision-making insti-
tutions is necessary to influence 
policy in a gender-sensitive way, 
efforts to better include parlia-
ments in the PRS process should 
also help to increase women’s 
share in parliamentary seats. 
More efforts to include the poor 
via CBOs should take into ac-
count the fact that women per-
form a large proportion of volun-
tary community work and, more 
than men, are involved in self-
help and informal grassroots 
NGOs. 
III. An up-scaling of mainstreaming 
efforts: The issues of social ine-
quality shaped by gender dispari-
ties and the meaningful participa-
tion of gender representatives 
need to be firmly embedded at a 
higher level of political dialogue 
and decision-making. Gender 
analysis of poverty dimensions 
and the impacts of poverty reduc-
tion strategies need to be main-
streamed and supplemented by 
additional analyses. Anchoring a 
gender perspective in the macro-
economic framework is pivotal to 
the PRS framework’s enhanced 
harmonization with socio-
economic poverty reduction 
measures. Thus, gender budget 
initiatives – actively lobbying and 
monitoring the national budgets 
from a critical gender perspective 
– are very effective political fora 
(i.e. Tanzania). South-south ex-
changes – as established by gen-
der networks in southern Africa – 
should therefore be supported by 
bi- and multilateral donors. How-
ever, the opening-up of macro-
economic policymaking in gen-
eral and the disclosure of docu-
ments on the macro-economic 
framework as well as PRS proc-
esses better linked to budget cy-
cles and PERs are preconditions 
for a meaningful participation of 
women´s organizations and gen-
der experts on an upper level of 
decision-making processes in the 
PRS. 
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Table 2: Actor-specific recommendations: An Overview 
Donors 
• Engaging in substantive, country-led policy dialogues; moving 
out of the capitals in order to support dialogues with stake-
holders in rural areas  
• Intensifying support and finance on efforts for institutionaliza-
tion, empowerment of the poor and capacity and network 
building of CSOs 
• Supporting actively the different control functions of parlia-
ments by enquiring how parliaments were involved in the 
PRS-approval and reporting on this in the JSA 
Governments 
• Giving high priority to the institutionalization of stakeholder 
participation in PRS processes by  
• Strengthening a rights-based and legal basis for involving 
other actors, e. g. parliaments 
• Strengthening transparency and accountability through im-
proved information systems in the context of PRS monitoring 
• Increasing/initiating intra-governmental coordination in policy 
reforms 
Parliaments 
• Seizing opportunities for policy capacity building, improving 
their functional capacities of legislation, budgetary power and 
other control functions 
• Seeking entry points for meddling in (budgetary control) 
• Strengthening interactions with other actors: creating public 
forums /hearings for citizens and parliamentarians to meet 
CSOs/CBOs 
• Intensifying networking and peer learning processes 
• Building/strengthening alliances (vertical: north-
south/horizontal: south-south) 
• Stronger alliances with members of parliament and link-ups 
with representatives of legislature committees in a transparent 
manner 
• Involving the poor and transmitting their interests to the 
macro-level (scaling-up) 
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ALAT The Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania 
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BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) 
CAS Country Assistance Strategy 
CBO Community Based Organization 
CG Consultative Group 
CIDSE Coopération Internationale pour le Développement 
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CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
DFID Department for International Development 
EURODAD European Network on Debt and Development 
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GAPVOD Ghana Private Voluntary Organizations in 
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GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation) 
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
IDA International Development Association 
IDS Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) 
IEO Independent Evaluation Office 
IFI International Finance Institution 
IIED International Institute of Environment and 
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IMF International Monetary Fund 
INEF Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (Institute for 
Development and Peace) 
INGO International NGO 
JSA Joint Staff Assessment 
KIPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and 
Analysis 
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M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
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NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank) 
PAF Poverty Action Fund 
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PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Uganda) 
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Nichtregierungsorganisationen (Association of 
German Development NGOs) 
WB The World Bank 
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